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INCENTIVIZING THE UTILIZATION
OF PHARMACOGENOMICS IN DRUG
DEVELOPMENT
VALERIE GUTMANN KOCH*
I. INTRODUCTION
The last decades have witnessed remarkable advancements in the fields of
genetics and genomics, highlighted by the successful completion of the map of the
human genome in 2003.1 With this achievement came scientific possibilities that,
only a few decades earlier, seemed more science fiction than reality. Of these
developments, pharmacogenomics is hailed by many as a panacea for problems
associated with pharmaceutical drug use and development. 2 The Human Genome
Project (HGP) and associated research have demonstrated that all human beings
share 99.9 percent of their DNA. 3 Pharmacogenomics focuses on the 0.1 percent
differences between individuals and promises to allow physicians to tailor a
patient‘s prescription according to his or her genetic profile, reducing painful and
sometimes deadly side effects, ensuring appropriate dosage decisions, and targeting
specific disease pathways.4

Copyright © 2012 by Valerie Gutmann Koch.
* Valerie Gutmann Koch, J.D. is the Senior Attorney for the New York State Task Force on Life and the
Law. The views expressed here are those of the author, and do not reflect those of the New York State
Department of Health, Health Research, Inc., or the Task Force. The author would like to acknowledge
Peter Hutt in the conception of this article.
1. The Human Genome Project ―sequenced a single genome‖ for about 4 billion dollars, and Craig
Venter, a leader in the field of biotechnology, did it for 100 million dollars. Getting Personal: The
Promise
of
Cheap
Genome
Sequencing,
ECONOMIST
(Apr.
16,
2009),
http://www.economist.com/node/13437974.?story_id=13437974.
2. See Michael J. Meurer, Pharmacogenomics, Genetic Tests, and Patent-Based Incentives, in
PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 399, 403 (F. Scott Kieff ed., 2003)
(acknowledging the promise of ―tailored medicine‖); see also Allen D. Roses, Pharmacogenetics and
the Practice of Medicine, 405 NATURE 857, 857, 863 (2000) (foreseeing the ability to use DNA to
predict drug reactions). But see John A. Robertson et al., Pharmacogenetic Challenges for the Health
Care System, HEALTH AFF., July–Aug. 2002, at 155, 157 (questioning whether genetic effects are
significant or predictable enough to alter drug therapy).
3. Press Release, Nat‘l Human Genome Research Inst., Whole Genome Ass‘n Studies (Feb. 8,
2006), http://www.genome.gov/17516714.
4. See id. (detailing the 0.1 percent difference between individuals); see also Meurer, supra note 2,
at 403 (outlining the benefits of pharmacogenomics).
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However, pharmacogenomics is unlikely to fulfill the promise of providing
―miracle drugs‖ to all.5 The pharmaceutical industry may be reluctant to pursue
pharmacogenomics because of the costs associated with developing products for a
segmented patient population,6 and the current regulatory and legal system may be
ill-prepared to deal with the practical, economic, legal, and ethical issues associated
with genetic discoveries.7 This article explores a number of dimensions of the
problems associated with pharmacogenomic discoveries and considers the future of
this exciting and complex field.
A. The History and Promise of Pharmacogenomics
Genomics can be defined as ―the study of the function and structure of genes
and gene products.‖8 Pharmacogenomics, a field within genomics, refers to the
study of how an individual, based on his or her genetic makeup, responds to drugs,
focusing on one‘s susceptibility to disease and response to drug therapies. 9
The history of pharmacogenomics started in the early twentieth century with a
scientific concentration on Mendelian effects on drug response. 10 The discipline of
pharmacogenetics predated pharmacogenomics, and was first articulated by Arno
Motulsky in 1957,11 who asserted that ―otherwise innocuous genetic traits‖ might
underlie variation among individuals in drug response, based on individual
differences in enzyme structure and function. 12 Although the field of
pharmacogenetics is relatively well-established, it has only recently had a
significant impact on the pharmaceutical industry. 13
5. See infra notes 67–68 and accompanying text (explaining that the benefits of individuallytailored drugs are overstated).
6. Meurer, supra note 2, at 401 (explaining the private returns and social costs associated with
advancements in pharmacogenomics).
7. See Robertson et al., supra note 2, at 159–64 (reviewing a variety of regulatory challenges
associated with pharmacogenomics).
8. Meurer, supra note 2, at 402.
9. David Housman & Fred D. Ledley, Why Pharmacogenomics? Why Now?, 16 NATURE
BIOTECH. 2, 2 (Supp. 1998). It is important to ensure that pharmacogenomics is distinguished from
predisposition or predictive testing, the latter of which ―provide[s] statistical inferences concerning the
risk of a disease or its prognosis.‖ Id. More specifically within pharmacogenomics, pharmacokinetics is
defined as the study of the variation in drug metabolism, while pharmacodynamics is the mechanism of
a drug on its target. Andrew Marshall, Laying the Foundations for Personalized Medicines, 16 NATURE
BIOTECH. 6, 6–7 (Supp. 1998).
10. David B. Goldstein et al., Pharmacogenetics Goes Genomic, 4 NATURE REV. GENETICS 937
(2003). Gregor Mendel ―discovered‖ the laws of genetics in 1865 with his famous studies of the heredity
of traits in pea pod plants. Salvatore Giorgianni, Solving the Mysteries of Inheritance, PFIZER J.,
Summer 1998, at 1, 1. His discoveries were generally ignored until the next century, when they were
―rediscovered‖ and applied over a number of disciplines. Id.
11. Goldstein et al., supra note 10, at 937.
12. Arno G. Motulsky, Drug Reactions, Enzymes, and Biochemical Genetics, 165 JAMA 835, 835
(1957).
13. See Housman & Ledley, supra note 9, at 2 (explaining recent developments contributing to the
significance of pharmacogenetics).
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The terms pharmacogenetics and pharmacogenomics are often used
interchangeably;14 however, it is necessary to understand that a distinction exists.
Some merely define pharmacogenomics as the ensuing broadening of
pharmacogenetics.15 While pharmacogenetics applies to the reaction of genetically
diverse patients to a particular medicine (―one drug across many genomes‖),16
pharmacogenomics encompasses pharmacogenetics, but also applies at earlier
phases of drug development, in determining which compounds will be most
effective for a particular genome (―many drugs across one genome‖).17
Pharmacogenetics is most useful for already-available drugs, in that it can be
applied to existing drugs and development programs; in contrast,
―pharmacogenomics will exert its impact at the drug discovery stage and will thus
appear in products over the long term.‖18
Regardless of their definitional distinctions, the goals of both
pharmacogenomics and pharmacogenetics are identical:
[T]o improve the diagnosis of genetic disease; to develop drugs to
fight genetic disease; to make clinical testing of drugs more efficient
by identifying populations in which the drugs are likely to be
especially efficacious . . . and, using genetic information about
patients, to maximize therapeutic benefit and minimize harmful side
effects by prescribing drugs to targeted patient populations. 19
In the area of drug discovery and development, pharmacogenomics promises
to offer better matching between patients and the appropriate drugs and to reduce or

14. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, PHARMACOGENETICS: ETHICAL ISSUES 4 tbl.1.1 (2003).
15. Id.
16. Id.; Jai Shah, Concept and Putative Application of Pharmacogenetics and Pharmacogenomics,
HEALTH L. REV., no. 2, 2004 at 3, 4.
17. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 14, at 4 tbl.1.1; Shah, supra note 16, at 3, 4. The
World Health Organization provides the following distinction:
Pharmacogenetics refers to the study of DNA sequence variation as it relates to
differential drug response of individuals, i.e., the use of genomics to determine an
individual‘s response. Pharmacogenomics refers to the use of DNA-based genotyping in
order to target pharmaceutical agents to specific patient populations in the design of
drugs.
World Health Organization, Progress in Pharmacogenetics and Pharmacogenomics, 16 WHO DRUG
INFO. 17, 17 (2002). Other commentators state that ―[p]harmacogenetics is the application of single gene
sequence or a limited set of multiple gene sequences to study variation in DNA sequences related to
drug action or drug disposition,‖ while ―[p]harmacogenomics is the application of genome-wide singlenucleotide polymorphism maps and genome-wide gene expression analysis to study variations that
influence drug action.‖ Jack E. Urquhart et al., The Duty to Use Pharmacogenetics and
Pharmacogenomics to Reduce the Risk of Idiosyncratic Drug-Induced Liver Injury, FINDLAW (Mar.
2004), http://library.findlaw.com/2004/Feb/27/133310.html (citing Lawrence Lesko et al.,
Pharmacogenetics and Pharmacogenomics in Drug Development and Regulatory Decision Making:
Report of the First FDA-PWG-PhRMA-DruSafe Workshop, 43 J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 342, 343–
44 (2003)).
18. Shah, supra note 16, at 4.
19. LORI B. ANDREWS ET AL., GENETICS: ETHICS, LAW AND POLICY 423 (2002).
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eliminate adverse effects,20 enabling correct dosage according to one‘s particular
metabolism.
1. Designer Drugs, Adverse Drug Reactions, and Metabolism
The promise most commonly associated with pharmacogenomics is the
advancement of new ―designer drugs‖ that may be developed to meet an
individual‘s particular health needs, thereby increasing a drug‘s effectiveness.21
The completion of the HGP was accompanied by the potential for the development
of ―individualized medicine,‖22 and it has been suggested that applying genetic
knowledge to drug development is as simple as ―start[ing] backwards and
build[ing] a drug that addresses the problem.‖23 Clinical researchers identify drug
targets or pathway proteins as potential objectives for pharmacogenomic drug
development.24 For example, variations in one gene (GNB3) are associated with a
response to antidepressants, while variations in another (AGT) are associated with
reduction of blood pressure with anti-hypertensive treatment.25
Dr. Craig Venter, one of the major players behind the HGP, has predicted that
eventually each of us ―might carry something similar to a bar code that identifies
our genotype, and this would help us make healthcare decisions.‖26 For example,
since the late 1990‘s, pharmacogenetics has been used to predict the effectiveness
of Herceptin, a drug for metastatic breast cancer. 27 Herceptin is especially effective
in shrinking tumors and extending lives for approximately thirty percent of breast
cancer patients—those whose tumors have unusually high amounts of the
HER2/neu protein.28 The use of Herceptin illustrates the ability to identify drugs
according to an individual‘s genetic profile; it is now considered the standard of

20. Meurer, supra note 2, at 401.
21. See id. at 401 (noting the potential for individualized drugs from pharmacogenomics); see also
D.C. Wertz, Ethical, Social and Legal Issues in Pharmacogenomics, 3 PHARMACOGENOMICS J. 194, 194
(2003) (discussing the promise of designing drugs for custom medicines). Currently, most drugs have an
average effectiveness rate of 50 percent. Lawrence J. Lesko & Issam Zineh, DNA, Drugs & Chariots:
On a Decade of Pharmacogenomics at the US FDA, 11 PHARMACOGENOMICS 507, 511 (2010).
22. Henry T. Greely, Pharmacogenomics: Promise, Prospects, and Potential Problems, MED.
ETHICS, Winter 2002, at 2.
23. DEAN HAMER & PETER COPELAND, LIVING WITH OUR GENES: WHY THEY MATTER MORE
THAN YOU THINK 303–04 (1998). The authors state, ―[i]ndividual DNA sequences, combined with
existing computer modeling techniques, would allow drugs to be as precise as a key in a lock.‖ Id.
24. See Goldstein et al., supra note 10, at 940 tbl.1a (providing examples of common drug targets
and pathway proteins that are associated with drug response).
25. Id.
26. J. Craig Venter, The Genome Project – From Microbes to Man, PFIZER J., Summer 1998, at 7,
11.
27. The Making of the Pharmacogenomic Prescription, GENE LETTER (Jan. 27, 2010),
http://www.geneletter.com/the-making-of-the-pharmacogenomic-prescription-22/
(―[T]ests
are
performed to predict whether it will work in a particular patient prior to drug prescription.‖).
28. Shah, supra note 16, at 6.
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care for that particular form of breast cancer. 29 Pharmacogenomics is also currently
used in Alzheimer‘s disease research.30 For instance, one study investigated the
relationship between Alzheimer‘s patients‘ genotypes and their response to certain
already-existing drugs, and found that a certain gene is a good predictor of response
to tacrine, a cholinesterase inhibitor.31
The second promise of pharmacogenomics is the reduction of adverse drug
reactions (ADRs). Fatal ADRs are considered to be between the fourth and sixth
leading causes of death, 32 accounting for approximately three percent of all deaths
in the general population.33 Moreover, it is estimated that ADRs cost society over
100 billion dollars per year.34 Applying pharmacogenomics to drug development
and prescription could potentially reduce the risk of adverse drug reactions such as
venous thrombosis, which is associated with the factor V Leiden allele. 35 Because
the use of oral contraceptives by women with the factor V Leiden allele greatly
increases the risk of venous thrombosis, it might be possible to test women for the
allele before making prescription decisions. 36 Likewise, would-be abacavir users
for the treatment of HIV infection could be tested for the HLA-B*5701 allele, so as
to reduce the incidence of hypersensitivity reactions to the use of the drug. 37

29. Penelope K. Manasco & Teresa E. Arledge, Drug Development Strategies, in
PHARMACOGENOMICS: SOCIAL, ETHICAL, AND CLINICAL DIMENSIONS 83, 96 (Mark A. Rothstein ed.,
2003).
30. See Roses, supra note 2, at 860 (identifying gene mutations associated with Alzheimer‘s
disease).
31. Andrew Marshall, Getting the Right Drug into the Right Patient, 16 NATURE BIOTECH., 9, 9
(Supp. 1998) (citing Judes Poirier et al., Apolipoprotein E4 Allele as a Predictor of Cholinergic Deficits
and Treatment Outcome in Alzheimer‟s Disease, 92 PROC. NAT‘L ACAD. SCI. 12260 (1995)).
32. Jason Lazarou et al., Incidence of Adverse Drug Reactions in Hospitalized Patients: A Metaanalysis of Prospective Studies, 279 JAMA 1200, 1202 (1998) (using data collected from 1994 to find
that ADRs are responsible for 100,000 drug-related deaths and 2.2 million hospitalizations each year in
the U.S.). See also Karin Wester et al., Incidence of Fatal Adverse Drug Reactions: A Population Based
Study, 65 BRIT. J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 573, 576 (2008) (finding that fatal ADRs was the seventh
most common cause of death in Sweden).
33. Wester et al., supra note 32, at 576.
34. Faith Lagay, Pharmacogenomics: Revolution in a Bottle?, VIRTUAL MENTOR (Mar. 2002),
http://virtualmentor.ama-assn.org/2002/03/gnth1-0203.html. See also SAM TETLOW, CAMBRIDGE
HEALTHTECH INST., SUCCESSFUL PHARMACOGENOMICS BUSINESS MODELS 4 (2002) (estimating that
the computed ADR cost in 1992 was 76.6 billion dollars); David J. Wu, A Pharmacogenomics Standard
for FDA Drug Approval: Arbitrary and Capricious or Safe and Effective?, 23 BIOTECH. L. REP. 733,
733 (2004) (citing annual cost estimates for ADRs at 30.1 to 136.8 billion dollars).
35. Muin J. Khoury & Jill Morris, Pharmacogenomics and Public Health: The Promise of Targeted
Disease Prevention, OFFICE OF PUB. HEALTH GENOMICS, CTRS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://web.archive.org/web/20090421103558/http://www.cdc.gov/genomics/training/perspectives/factsht
s/pharmacofs.htm (last updated Nov. 17, 2007) (explaining that while genetic testing to locate V Leiden
allele would be medically and scientifically useful, it would also be very costly).
36. Id.
37. Kathy L. Hudson, Genomics, Health Care, and Society, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1033, 1036–37
tbl.2 (2011); Simon Mallal et al., Association Between Presence of HLA-B*5701, HLA-DR7, and HLADQ3 and Hypersensitivity to HIV-1 Reverse-Transcriptase Inhibitor Abacavir, 359 LANCET 727, 731
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The study of genetics could also clarify why people respond differently to
medications and how a person‘s body metabolizes particular compounds. 38 The
manner by which an individual metabolizes certain drugs may depend on a set of
genes separate and unrelated from those correlated to any particular illness that is
present throughout the population.39 Simply put, certain genes have an impact on
metabolic rates.40 Because of genetic variations in metabolism, pharmacogenomic
discoveries may cause the drug prescription process to change. 41 Instead of
determining dosages by weight, age, and other proxies, physicians will be able to
prescribe according to an individual‘s genetic makeup, thereby ―maximiz[ing] the
therapy‘s value and decreas[ing] the likelihood of overdose.‖42
For example, the D2 receptor gene, DRD2, is associated with the metabolism
of certain antipsychotics.43 Likewise, if an individual carries the variant cytochrome
P450 gene, CYP2D6, which encodes a metabolic liver enzyme, he or she cannot
metabolize certain compounds, which could therefore allow lethal amounts of a
drug to accumulate in his or her body.44 It is claimed that ―[u]p to 30% of patients
do not respond optimally to certain drugs.‖45 If an individual‘s rate of metabolism
is too high, a patient will be undertreated because the drugs will not be delivered in
an efficacious manner.46 If metabolism is too low, it could lead to an overdose

(2002); Seth Hetherington et al., Genetic Variations in HLA-B Region and Hypersensitivity Reactions to
Abacavir, 359 LANCET 1121, 1121 (2002).
38. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 14, at 12 tbl.2.1.
39. As the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, an independent charitable body based in the UK,
explains, these genes do not necessarily have an effect on an individual‘s susceptibility to disease, but
how the person absorbs, metabolizes, and excretes compounds. Id.
40. See, e.g., Goldstein et al., supra note 10, at 941 tbl.1b (providing a table of pharmacogenetic
variants and their impacts on metabolism).
41. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 14, at 18.
42. Devesh D. Gosavi & Ganapat J. Pawar, Pharmacogenomics: Promises and Challenges, 2 INT‘L
J. RES. PHARMACEUTICAL BIOMED. SCI. 1444, 1445 (2011).
43. Yoshio Yamanouchi et al., Effect of DRD2, 5-HT2A, and COMT Genes on Antipsychotic
Response to Risperidone, 3 PHARMACOGENOMICS J. 356, 356, 358–59 (2003). One—perhaps now
outdated—table on genetic polymorphisms of human drug-metabolizing enzymes and transporters
(those genetic variations that are currently known to be susceptible to drug variations) is available
online. William E. Evans & Mary V. Relling, Pharmacogenomics: Translating Functional Genomics
into
Rational
Therapeutics,
286
SCI.
487,
489
tbl.1
(1999),
available
at
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/286/5439/487.full.pdf.
44. Wu, supra note 34, at 733. Other examples of prescribing particular dosages according to one‘s
metabolism in order to reduce adverse events include risk reduction strategies such as HIV resistance
testing and optimized dosing for HCV. See Jianming Tang & Richard A. Kaslow, Pharmacogenomic
Perspectives of Chronic Hepatitis C Virus (HCV) Infection, 4 PHARMACOGENOMICS J. 171, 172 (2004)
(reviewing the use of pharmacogenomics to improve dosing for HCV treatment); The Making of the
Pharmacogenomic Prescription, supra note 27 (discussing how pharmacogenomics is used for HIV
resistance testing).
45. Nusrat Khaleeli & Dennis Fernandez, Patent Prosecution in Pharmacogenomics, 88 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC‘Y 83, 88 (2006) (claiming that almost a third of patients respond less than ideally
to some pharmaceuticals).
46. Greely, supra note 22, at 1.
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because the site will be overdelivered.47 In other words, the ultra-rapid metabolism
of a drug can cause it to be ineffective and slow, or non-metabolism of a drug can
result in the accumulation of toxic amounts of the compound in the body.
Thus, physicians could modify an individual‘s prescription according to
multiple sets of genes and their interactions,48 in order to increase the probability of
optimal dosage.49 According to Janet Woodcock, Director of the Food and Drug
Administration‘s (FDA) Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER), the
variability in how individuals metabolize compounds is ―a huge problem, because
what‘s considered a normal dose of a drug can be toxic for some people.‖50 She
praises the advantages of using pharmacogenomics to determine dosages according
to a patient‘s genetic profile.51
2. Diagnosis, Treatment, and Categorization of Disease
Further, pharmacogenomics promises that our knowledge of the biology
underlying illness will increase through the identification of susceptibility genes,
which might lead to a better understanding of gene products. 52 This, in turn, will
trigger greater awareness of the role of individual proteins in causing illness,
thereby leading to further appreciation of the interaction of these proteins with
other substances, as well as the effect of the environment on protein levels and
function.53 These developments may result in new forms of diagnosis, treatment,
and possibly prevention of many illnesses and disorders.54
Although this article primarily focuses on the intersection of
pharmacogenomics and the drug development process, diagnosis is another area in
which genetic discoveries may have a significant impact. Currently, the process of
diagnosis can be quite haphazard, and the trial-and-error method common in the
experience of most physicians and patients can take its toll.55 Take, for instance,

47. Id.
48. See DAVID MELZER ET AL., MY VERY OWN MEDICINE: WHAT MUST I KNOW: INFORMATION
POLICY FOR PHARMACOGENETICS 53 (2003) (according to one study, 59 percent of drugs are
―metabolised by at least one enzyme that has a variant allele known to cause poor metabolism‖); see
also NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 14, at 88 (expressing concerns that doctors will
group individuals by ethnicity and will refuse to prescribe medications just because they were found to
be ineffective in others of the same ethnic group).
49. See Khaleeli & Fernandez, supra note 45, at 87–88 (finding that a goal of pharmacogenomics is
to identify individual patients and ensure appropriate medication dosages).
50. Tracy Hampton, FDA Seeks Genome-Based Drug Data, 291 JAMA 32, 32–33 (2004).
51. Id.
52. Nick Craddock & Ian Jones, Genetics of Bipolar Disorder, 36 J. MED. GENETICS 585, 592
(1999).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Maree L. Inder et al., ―I Really Don‟t Know Whether it is Still There”: Ambivalent
Acceptance of a Diagnosis of Bipolar Disorder, 81 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 157, 157 (2010) (describing the
haphazard diagnosis among individuals with bipolar disorder).
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bipolar disorder, a mental illness that affects 3.9 percent of the American
population in their lifetime, with an average age-of-onset of 25 years.56 It is one of
the most fatal of all illnesses, with a suicide rate of up to 20 percent. 57 One survey
found that although 26.2 percent of adults may have some sort of mental illness
within a given year, only 12 percent receive minimally adequate treatment.58 This
low rate of success is telling of the historical ―needle-in-a-haystack‖ process of
diagnosis. The isolation of genes that predispose certain individuals to particular
illnesses will lead to an improvement in the understanding of the causes and
mechanisms of the illnesses themselves.59 For example, mental health physicians
began to see this improvement during the revisions of the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III) in the 1980‘s, as the definitions shifted
away from psychoanalytic assumptions toward a more standardized biology-based
approach.60
Moreover, the process of identifying the right dosage and combination of
medications can be extraordinarily slow and discouraging, and it can take months,
or even years, to determine the most effective treatment regimen for many
diseases.61 For example, the Surgeon General‘s Office reported that approximately
30 to 50 percent of patients diagnosed with major depressive episodes do not
respond to their original medication.62 It has been argued that genetic discoveries
will allow us to develop a ―molecular taxonomy of disease,‖63 or ―a rational,
aetiology-based classification of . . . disorders which will almost certainly provide a
much better guide to treatment and prognosis than do current classifications.‖64

56. Bipolar
Disorder
Among
Adults,
NAT‘L
INST.
MENTAL
HEALTH,
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/statistics/1BIPOLAR_ADULT.shtml (last visited Feb. 14, 2012); Liberty
Fajutrao et al., A Systematic Review of the Evidence of the Burden of Bipolar Disorder in Europe, 5
CLINICAL
PRAC.
&
EPIDEMIOLOGY
MENTAL
HEALTH
3
(2009),
http://w09.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1745-0179-5-3.pdf.
57. Peter
M.
Brigham,
The
Psychopharmacology
of
Bipolar
Disorder,
http://home.comcast.net/~pmbrig/BP_pharm.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2012).
58. Any
Disorder
Among
Adults¸
NAT‘L
INST.
MENTAL
HEALTH,
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/statistics//1ANYDIS_ADULT.shtml (last visited Jan. 11, 2012).
59. Nicholas J. Schork, Genetics of Complex Disease: Approaches, Problems, and Solutions, 156
AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. S103, S105 (Supp. 1997) (describing that the study of
genetics could lead to investigations into: ―(1) the frequency of the deleterious gene in the population,
(2) the effect of the gene in the presence of other factors . . . [and] (3) the impact of public health and
health economics of the gene if its effects were ameliorated‖).
60. See Rick Mayes & Allan V. Horwitz, DSM-III and the Revolution in Classification of Mental
Illness, 41 J. HIST. BEHAV. SCI. 249, 264 (2005) (detailing how the DSM-III help diagnosticians move
away from psychoanalysis to the more dominant symptom-based approach to diagnosing mental
disorders).
61. P.C. Carder et al., Negotiating Medications: Patient Perceptions of Long-Term Medication Use,
28 J. CLINICAL PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 409, 412 (2003).
62. DEP‘T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON
GENERAL-EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 263 (1999).
63. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 14, at xvii.
64. Craddock & Jones, supra note 52, at 592.
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Indeed, the discovery of genes that confer vulnerability to an illness could
establish multiple and distinct biological causes for the same symptoms, thus
creating new categories of an overarching illness.65 These subcategories could have
diverse molecular and environmental causes, while being manifested in similar
physical or behavioral symptoms. 66 Thus, in the future, diagnosis could be
categorized by the individual‘s biological interactions or one‘s predetermined
reactions to certain medications. For example, the current categories of cancer—
based on location and type of tumor—may become obsolete, as the understanding
of the molecular biology of illness improves.
B. The Complexity of Pharmacogenomics
An important disclaimer is necessary: pharmacogenomics is not as simple as
analyzing one‘s genetic makeup to make drug dosage and prescription decisions. 67
Pharmacogenomics does not promise perfectly individualized medicine; it will only
accelerate the process of tailoring treatment decisions to one‘s genetic
predispositions.68 As researchers have focused on the probabilistic nature of
genetics, it is becoming clearer that the most common illnesses, if genetic, are
compounded by drug interactions and environmental and physiological factors such
as nutrition, aging, and liver and kidney function. 69 Thus, the application of

65. Many believe that ―it is likely that some conditions which are now considered to be single
disorders, with a common set of symptoms, will be discovered to be more heterogeneous, with several
different biochemical disorders leading to a common set of clinical features.‖ NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON
BIOETHICS, supra note 14, at xviii.
66. See generally id.
67. See generally Daniel W. Nebert & Elliot S. Vessell, Advances in Pharmacogenomics and
Individualized Drug Therapy: Exciting Challenges that Lie Ahead, 500 EUR. J. PHARMACOLOGY 267
(2004) (describing the many challenges and factors effecting the success of pharmacogenomics).
68. See, e.g., TANYA M. LUHRMANN, OF TWO MINDS: THE GROWING DISORDER IN AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRY 48 (2000) (discussing the problem of genetic predispositions and the uncertainty of nonindividualized medicine).
69. See MELZER ET AL., supra note 48, at 53; see also Pat Buckley & Ross A. McKinnon,
Pharmacogenomics, Ethics, and the Community, 23 PHARMACIST 23, 23 (2004) (―The probabilistic
nature of pharmacogenomics needs to be appreciated when considering whether its application will
increase inequalities in the provision of health care. Pharmacogenomic tests are unlikely to indicate that
a particular medicine will definitely be effective or ineffective in a particular patient. Rather, they are
likely to provide probabilistic information . . . .‖). The FDA guidance to industry regarding the
submission of pharmacogenomic data is clear on the interaction between genes, the environment, and
other assorted factors, stating, ―[i]n most instances, a genotype or particular gene expression profile is
likely to be one of a number of factors that affects the probability of an adverse event or a favorable
response. For this reason, pharmacogenomic biomarkers can ordinarily be handled like other nongenomic predictive markers in the clinical arena.‖ FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP‘T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: PHARMACOGENOMIC DATA SUBMISSIONS 16 (2005)
[hereinafter 2005 FDA GUIDANCE]. See also Marshall, supra note 9, at 7 (―More often than not, several
genes, rather than one, interact with environmental factors to result in a particular variation in drug
action.‖).
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pharmacogenomics is likely much more complicated than some members of the
media and public hope and claim. 70
The ultimate promise of effective, personalized, tailor-made medicine, with
fewer side effects and more appropriate dosage, is tantalizing. However, there are a
number of issues that must be considered to proactively approach and anticipate
potential innovations and their implications rather than ―trying to implement
retroactive changes.‖71
Many of the problems encountered when considering the impact of
pharmacogenomics on society are multilayered and complex, and involve a myriad
of ethical, legal, and policy-related considerations. This article focuses on the role
of industry in furthering pharmacogenomic developments and the dimensions of
current regulatory and legislative decision-making in the discipline.72 The
discussion of the impact of pharmacogenomics would be incomplete without
addressing how theories of liability may change, or be changed, by
pharmacogenomic developments.73
II. PHARMACOGENOMIC DRUG RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
A. Industry Reluctance to Pursue Pharmacogenomics
Pharmaceutical companies may be reluctant to use pharmacogenomics to
develop potentially beneficial drugs and therapies because of the limited financial
benefit associated with drug development for smaller stratified patient populations.
These companies may be hesitant to pursue pharmacogenomics at all due to its
inherently unprofitability.74 Some critics assert that companies that sell the most
products that are ineffective for many consumers/patients have the least incentive to
do research to identify more effective drugs that will draw market share away from
their one-size-fits-all drugs.75 Companies with successful blockbuster drugs may be
cautious about pursuing pharmacogenomic research because alternative drugs may
only benefit a small portion of the population. 76 Pharmacogenomic developments
70. For example, one commentator, in a critique of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics‘ report on
pharmacogenetics, concluded that ―expert opinion is less optimistic as the complexities of gene/gene,
and gene/environment interaction have become more apparent.‖ Oonagh Patricia Corrigan,
Pharmacogenetics, Ethical Issues: Review of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics Report, 31 J. MED.
ETHICS 144, 146 (2005).
71. Barbara Ann Binzak, How Pharmacogenomics Will Impact the Federal Regulation of Clinical
Trials and the New Drug Approval Process, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 103, 104 (2003).
72. See infra Parts II–III.
73. See infra Part III.C.
74. Karen Peterson-Iyer, Pharmacogenomics, Ethics, and Public Policy, 18 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS
J. 35, 39 (2008).
75. Barbara J. Evans et al., Creating Incentives for Genomics Research to Improve Targeting of
Therapies, 10 NATURE MED. 1289, 1291 (2004).
76. See Peterson-Iyer, supra note 74, at 39; see also Pharmacogenomics: Medicine and the New
Genetics,
HUMAN
GENOME
PROJECT
INFO.,
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could lead to market segmentation by increasing research and development (R&D)
costs without raising profits.77 Income estimates for smaller, targeted patient
markets run 300 to 500 million dollars rather than the one billion dollars generally
associated with blockbuster drugs. 78 Thus, companies may bypass the use of
pharmacogenomics to develop potentially beneficial drugs and therapies because of
the perceived limited financial benefit. 79
However, if a rival company manufactures a drug that is obviously more
effective than the current blockbuster drug, people may stop buying the ineffective
one, thereby forcing sponsors of big-name drugs to focus on targeted drug
development in order to compete in the market. In other words, differentiating
drugs according to effectiveness in subpopulations may lead to increased
competition among companies.80
Even as it might fight it, industry is anticipating change, admitting that ―[t]he
era of the blockbuster is ending.‖81 However, it is unclear how ―the drug industry
will metamorphose itself.‖82 In fact, the configuration of the industry may shift so
much that Robert Freeman, the former Executive Director of Public Policy at
AstraZeneca, acknowledged, ―[w]e simply don‘t know what kind of business
model is necessary to commercialize personalized medicine.‖83 Some
pharmaceutical companies have actively begun pursuing pharmacogenomic
research.84 For example, GlaxoSmithKline ―has played a prominent role in

http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/medicine/pharma.shtml (last visited April 12,
2012) [hereinafter HUMAN GENOME PROJECT INFO].
77. Corrigan, supra note 70, at 145.
78. Wu, supra note 34, at 743.
79. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 14, at 29.
80. Commentators have noted big pharmaceutical companies‘ reluctance to enter the
pharmacogenomics market, but have conceded that although ―[i]ncreased attention to cost effectiveness
tends to reward well-targeted therapies for their low rates of treatment failure . . . drugs need only
outperform a standard or reference drug, which could itself be poorly targeted.‖ Evans et al., supra note
75, at 1290.
81. Pamela Sherrid, Is There a Market for Personal Medicine?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 20,
2003, at 56, 56. Six of the ten most successful blockbuster drugs are scheduled to go off-patent in the
near future, including Pfizer‘s Lipitor. Chris Woolston, Blockbuster-Drug Prices to Drop as Patents
Expire, L.A. TIMES, July 25, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/25/news/la-heb-generics-drugprices-20110725.
82. Sherrid, supra note 81.
83. Id.
84. Amber L. Beitelshees & David L. Veenstra, Evolving Research and Stakeholder Perspectives
on Pharmacogenomics, 306 JAMA 1252, 1252 (2011) (citing recent studies including one by
GlaxoSmithKline investigators, which ―has identified major histocompatibility complex genetic variants
associated with liver damage in response to lapatinib, which is already Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) approved for the treatment of breast cancer,‖ another in which the ―epidermal growth factor
receptor (EGFR) tyrosine kinase inhibitors erlotinib and gefitinib recently [was] shown to be more
effective in patients with non–small cell lung cancer (NSCLC) who have certain EGFR tumor
mutations,‖ and a third by Pfizer to develop a drug ―(crizotinib) for NSCLC, which is projected to be
indicated for 3% to 5% of patients with an EML4-ALK fusion gene variation‖). By 1998, three major
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promoting pharmacogenetics, with company scientists producing a number of
scientific papers in high profile science and medical journals urging the uptake of
pharmacogenetics.‖85
B. Advantages of Using Pharmacogenomics in Drug Development
1. Potential Cost-Saving Measures
Drug R&D is expensive and relatively haphazard. In 2010, industry spent an
estimated 67.4 billion dollars on pharmaceutical R&D. 86 The Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), the pharmaceutical trade
association, estimates the average cost to develop a drug at 1.3 billion dollars.87 It
currently takes an average of ten to fifteen years for a company to develop a drug. 88
Since most drugs do not make it to market, the profits from one product must make
up for the losses incurred for failed compounds. 89
Furthermore, only one of ―60,000 compounds synthesized by pharmaceutical
companies‖ can be considered ―highly successful.‖90 Success is currently measured
by the amount earned; ―highly successful‖ blockbuster drugs have annual global
sales over one billion dollars.91
A study by the Boston Consulting Group asserts that companies that are
hesitant to enter the ―genomics revolution head on‖ will suffer the consequences,
rendering them unable to compete in the market with those that do. 92 According to
one estimate, the incorporation of pharmacogenomics into drug development could

companies–Genset, Celera Genomics, and Incyte Genetics–had already begun preparations to undertake
systematic searches of the genome for variants or single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), and a
number of other companies had been created in order to develop molecular diagnostics. Jeanette J.
McCarthy & Rolf Hilfiker, The Use of Single-Nucleotide Polymorphism Maps in Pharmacogenomics,
18 NATURE BIOTECH. 505, 505 (2000).
85. Corrigan, supra note 70, at 145.
86. PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., 2011 PROFILE 10 (2011).
87. Id. This estimate is highly contentious. See, e.g., Donald W. Light & Rebecca Warburton,
Demythologizing the High Cost of Pharmaceutical Research, 6 BIOSOCIETIES 34, 36, 38–39 (2011)
(critiquing the high costs associated research and development of new drugs).
88. PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM, supra note 86, at 12 fig.4.
89. ―Only about one in six drug candidates that enter clinical trials are ultimately submitted to and
approved by the FDA, according to a study of the 50 largest companies.‖ Id. at 10.
90. C.E. Reeder & W. Michael Dickson, Economic Implications of Pharmacogenomics, in
PHARMACOGENOMICS: SOCIAL, ETHICAL, AND CLINICAL DIMENSIONS 229, 230 (Mark A. Rothstein ed.,
2003).
91. Michael N. Liebman, Personalised Medicine: End of the Blockbuster?, 9 PHARMA FOCUS ASIA,
no. 9, 2008 at 4, 8.
92. PETER TOLLMAN ET AL., BOSTON CONSULTING GRP., A REVOLUTION IN R&D: HOW GENOMICS
AND GENETICS ARE TRANSFORMING THE BIOPHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 21 (2001).
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lead to a reduction in the cost and time of drug development, saving up to 45
percent of clinical drug development costs. 93
Pharmacogenomics can be applied at every phase in the drug development
process, and companies may be able to save substantial R&D costs and speed up
the drug approval process because of the ability to reduce the population in which
the drug is tested, leading to more reliable findings, ostensibly faster institutional
review board (IRB) review and approval, and safer trials.94 Individuals for whom
the drug in question is less likely to be effective, or those for whom the drug may
have deleterious side effects, can be excluded from the various stages of clinical
trials, thereby improving the protection of participants in human research. 95
Moreover, the ―selection of smaller groups of genetically homogenous participants
in clinical trials may be advantageous, leading to more robust and reliable scientific
findings regarding the group of patients who might eventually be prescribed the
medicine.‖96
Reducing the failure rate could ―far outweigh the negatives of market
segmentation,‖ according to Nicholas Dracopoli, the former Vice President of
Clinical Discovery Technologies at Bristol-Myers Squibb.97 A drug guaranteed to
work on the percentage of the population ―for whom other drugs are ineffective or
cause harmful side effects will return steady revenue at a premium price‖—
resulting in the development of reliable ―mini-busters.‖98 Currently, blockbusters
are the biggest source of revenue for many drug companies, but ―mini-busters‖

93. Reeder & Dickson, supra note 90, at 231 (estimating 45 percent savings of clinical drug
development costs). Another group estimates the cost of developing a new medicine to be reduced to
about 60 percent of the cost. TOLLMAN ET AL., supra note 92, at 12 (estimating a savings of 300 million
dollars from an average 880 million dollars in costs).
94. Marshall, supra note 31, at 12 (asserting several rewards of pharmacogenomics such as quicker
development and increased financial pay-offs for pharmaceutical companies). Goldstein et al., states:
One motivation for pharmacogenetic testing during drug development is that the
stratification of patients by genotype might allow the identification of responses that would
have been missed in an unselected cohort. This could allow efficacy for subgroups to be
shown in drugs that might not have been considered effective in general populations,
which could potentially improve the success rate of compounds. Because of the huge costs
per patient of clinical trials, it has also been suggested that such streamlining might reduce
the average cost of developing new compounds.
Goldstein et al., supra note 10, at 945.
95. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 14, at xiv.
96. Id.
97. Sherrid, supra note 81.
98. Lagay, supra note 34 (asserting that such drugs will return a steady revenue at a premium
price); Evans et al., supra note 75, at 1289 (asserting that tailored treatments could generate new
avenues for income); Catherine Schaffer, Pfizer Explores Rare Disease Path, 28 NATURE BIOTECH. 881,
881 (2010) (defining ―mini-busters‖ as drugs which treat a small population by pharma standards, but
can be charged at a premium due to the demand).
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could replace the blockbusters with new, more genome-specific drugs.99 For
example, pharmacogenomic discoveries ―threaten[ ] to shake up the lucrative 26
billion dollar market for Statins—the big-selling products that help lower
cholesterol in the blood and reduce the risk of heart attacks and strokes.‖100
However, the view that pharmacogenomics will lead to more efficacious,
reliable, and safe clinical trials because of more targeted trial studies is not without
its detractors.101 For example, some believe that ―the small size of
pharmacogenetics studies renders them unconvincing.‖102 In addition, the restricted
trial populations will limit the claims a company can make on a drug to the FDA.103
This may affect the licenses FDA may grant, because approval will only be related
to the particular population in the pivotal trials. 104 The restriction of FDA approval
to specific patient groups could implicate a significant problem already plaguing
FDA, that of off-label prescription.105
2. Saving Shelved Drugs
Pharmacogenomics may also enable the re-marketing of ―shelved‖ drugs that
are rarely, if ever, prescribed because of an inability to determine for whom the
drugs work or because they cause adverse reactions in some patients. 106 Between
January 1, 1971 and May 31, 2006, over three percent of drugs approved by FDA
were withdrawn due to unacceptable side effects.107 Genetic tests may be able to
revive such drugs that were withdrawn from the market. 108 The identification of a

99. See Javier Barrios-González & Roxana U. Miranda, Biotechnological Production and
Application of Statins, 85 APPLIED MICROBIOLOGY & BIOTECH. 869, 869 (2010) (stating that the two
highest selling drugs in the United States in 2006 were statins).
100. Genes Play Role In Who Benefits From Statin—In Boost to „Personalize Medicine,‟ Study Links
Patient Genetics with Efficacy of Cholesterol Drug, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2004, at D1. In one study,
―[p]atients with a certain common genetic variant had a 22% smaller drop in total cholesterol and a 19%
smaller drop in LDL or ‗bad‘ cholesterol than those patients without the variant.‖ Id.
101. See MELZER ET AL., supra note 48, at 33 (questioning the generalizability of
pharmacogenomics in pre-licensing drug trials).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 34–35 (assessing the issues created by a smaller target population in detecting unusual
adverse events).
104. See id. (detailing the uncertainty surrounding the regulatory guidelines for pharmacogenetic
products).
105. See infra Part III.A.2.b.
106. Greely, supra note 22, at 2.
107. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RES., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REPORT TO THE NATION 2005:
IMPROVING PUBLIC HEALTH THROUGH HUMAN DRUGS 49 (2005) [hereinafter REPORT TO THE NATION].
108. Meurer, supra note 2, at 401. One commentator highlighted the anti-epileptic drug felbamate in
order to clarify the use of pharmacogenomics to reduce ADRs. Goldstein et al., supra note 10, at 945.
The drug was approved in 1993, after it was demonstrated that it helped control seizures. Id. During a
clinical investigation, there was no evidence of clinically significant blood or liver disorders related to
use of the drug. Id. However, 34 cases of aplastic anaemia and 23 cases of hepatic failure, with 18
reported fatalities, were reported in the first year after licensing. Id. It is believed that these ADRs and
associated deaths were related to the metabolism of the drug. Id. The authors contend that ―[t]he ability
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―unique population . . . that benefits from a drug that once experienced lagging
sales because of its ineffectiveness in the larger overall population‖ could mean that
―the postmarketing use of pharmacogenomic data may be quite useful to a drug
company.‖109
Moreover, like those products that were shelved after FDA approval, drugs
that had not made it through the approval process or were abandoned during
development may also be given a second chance. 110 Companies may take advantage
of ―Lazarus‖ programs in which drugs that have failed to receive FDA approval
due to high rates of ADRs or low efficacy can be ―resurrected and used to treat
genetically selected responders.‖111 Thus, ―[p]reviously failed drug candidates may
be revived as they are matched with the niche population they serve.‖112 In
particular, drugs in Phase III trials may be ―rescued‖ due to a new ability to reduce
the rate of toxicity or adverse events in the identified testing population. 113 It has
been predicted that although the big pharmaceutical companies may continue to
abandon these drugs (―why try to rescue a failed compound when pipelines are
overflowing with leads?‖), such drugs may present desirable opportunities for
smaller biotech companies who choose to pursue licensing.114
3. Avoiding Scandal (and Harm to Patients)
Companies may also be able to avoid scandals like that associated with the
antiarthritic drug Vioxx. In 2004, Merck & Co. initiated the biggest voluntary drug
recall in history due to evidence that Vioxx raises the risk of heart attack and
stroke.115 The recall incensed FDA critics, who have accused the FDA of lacking
aggressiveness and ―foot-dragging‖ once a drug has entered the market. 116 Agency

to reliably predict which patients might be at risk of such reactions to felbamate might allow greater
confidence in its use, and again make available a potentially valuable AED [anti-epileptic drug] for
patients with epilepsy that can itself be life-threatening.‖ Id. This example is illustrative of the optimism
many have for FDA-approved drugs that have been shelved due to adverse reactions. The authors claim
that the economic incentives for ―unshelving‖ the drug could be well worth it, explaining that ―[i]f
pharmacogenetic predictors of adverse events could prevent the exposure of genetically vulnerable
patients and so preserve even a single drug, the costs of any large-scale research effort in
pharmacogenetics could be fully recovered.‖ Id.
109. Binzak, supra note 71, at 126.
110. Andrew Marshall, One Drug Does Not Fit All, 16 NATURE BIOTECH. 1, 1 (Supp. 1998)
(discussing ―Lazarus‖ programs in which products that had been shelved after not making it through the
approval process).
111. Id.
112. HUMAN GENOME PROJECT INFO, supra note 78.
113. MELZER ET AL., supra note 48, at 31.
114. Marshall, supra note 110, at 1.
115. See Recall of Merck Arthritis Drug Vioxx Recall Leads to New Questions on FDA Effectiveness,
KAISER
HEALTH
NEWS
(Oct.
4,
2004),
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/DailyReports/2004/October/04/dr00026061.aspx?p=1 (reporting concerns surrounding the FDA approval
process for pharmaceuticals).
116. Id.
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response to the Vioxx debacle has included a focus on pharmacogenomics. Steven
Galson, then-Acting Director of CDER, said that, among other things, FDA would
―promot[e] research on pharmacogenetics to help identify people who might react
adversely to drugs.‖117 Thus, with an increase in pharmacogenomic research, drugs
companies like Merck may be less likely to lose money late in trials due to safety
and efficacy problems (even after FDA has already approved the drug), and will
therefore be able to avoid withdrawing a drug from the market and the concomitant
negative press and profit loss.118
C. The Public and Private Sectors: Shifts and Collaborations
Identifying resources for R&D is of primary significance to encouraging
pharmacogenomic advancement. Generally, ―[f]ederal subsidies and public sector
research . . . play significant roles stimulating the development of the first
generation of genetic tests designed to customize drug therapy.‖119 Going forward,
pharmacogenomics will continue to require public sector funding to encourage the
private sector to develop tests for existing drugs. 120 It may be necessary to either
incentivize private sponsorship of drug development, or the government will need
to provide greater federal subsidies. 121 In particular, alternative sources of funding
may be most needed where genetic tests ―are not widely adopted, when tests are
designed for use with substitute drugs manufactured by different companies, or
when the private cost of test development is high because of licensing costs.‖122

117. Id.
118. Evans et al., supra note 75, at 1289.
119. Meurer, supra note 2, at 401, 425 (―Thus far, public sector funding and R&D have been critical
to the creation and deployment of pharmacogenomic innovations.‖).
120. Id. at 401, 425–26 (suggesting that funding from the public sector will further the goals of
pharmacogenomics).
121. A Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (―PhRMA‖) report explained:
[A]ccording to the National Institutes of Health (NIH), public dollars are not funding the
research leading to new medicines. In fact, only 4 of the 47 top-selling drugs considered by
NIH in its study to determine if American public investments were funding new drug
development were developed in part with NIH funding, and none [were] developed solely
with public funds.
PHARM. RESEARCH & MFGS. AM., PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY PROFILE 5 (2004).
122. Meurer, supra note 2, at 425–26. Meurer concludes by recommending a number of options for
the type of public subsidies that should be offered, stating:
Presently, federal grants directly support public sector pharmacogenomic research, and
indirectly support pharmacogenomics through subsidies encouraging the production of
research inputs (like gene data) that are used in the development of genetic tests. The
government can encourage adoption of genetic tests through drug law and health insurance
regulation. Finally, the drug laws may be used to subsidize the development of drugs
designed to treat ―orphan genotypes.‖
Id. at 426.
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However, data supports the conclusion that some R&D support for
pharmacogenomics must shift from the public to the private sector. 123
Critics argue that economic considerations could lead to a differentiation
between the research focus in the industrial and academic sectors. 124 They
recommend that the appropriate regulatory mechanisms ensure cooperation
between sectors to facilitate the transfer of information and the development of
pharmacogenomic technology.125 There are a few public-private collaborations
already underway.126 The SNP Consortium, a non-profit foundation, was founded
to provide public genomic data online, thereby facilitating genomic research. 127
Pharmaceutical and technology companies, academic research centers, and the
Wellcome Trust have entered into a partnership ―to publish a high-density SNP
map of the human genome.‖128 The database of over 3.1 million SNPs is
maintained by Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory. 129
There have also been a number of agreements between pharmaceutical and
biotech companies.130 A 2003 survey indicated an interest in pharmacogenomic
collaborations by both small biotech companies that are generally involved in
providing test kits and other technological innovation, and large pharmaceutical
companies.131 In 1997, two other collaborations between companies involved a 25
million dollar deal between Incyte Genomics and GlaxoSmithKline to form
diaDEXUS, and a 42.5 million dollar agreement between Genset and Abbott to

123. See id. at 425 (―If pharmacogenomics fulfills its promise, then we should expect that, as this
sector of the pharmaceutical industry matures, most of the R&D on genetic tests will shift to the private
sector.‖); see also Beitelshees & Veenstra, supra note 84, at 1252 (―The pharmaceutical industry is
increasingly using pharmacogenomic strategies to identify patient subgroups with improved benefit-risk
profiles.‖).
124. Goldstein et al., supra note 10, at 945.
125. Likewise, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics recommends that public-private partnerships be
encouraged. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 14, at xiv.
126. See Arthur L. Holden, The SNP Consortium: Summary of a Private Consortium Effort to
Develop an Applied Map of the Human Genome, 32 BIOTECHNIQUES S22, S22, S23 (Supp. 2002)
(describing partnerships between private entities like the Wellcome Trust and public universities).
127. Id. at S22.
128. Celia M. Henry, Pharmacogenomics, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, Aug. 13, 2001, at 37,
39. In phase I of the HapMap project, ―[over] 1.1 million SNPs were genotyped in 270 individuals from
4 worldwide populations.‖ Gudmunder A. Thorisson et al., The International HapMap Project Web Site,
15 GENOME RES. 1592, 1592 (2005).
129. Int‘l HapMap Consortium, A Second Generation Human Haplotype Map of Over 3.1 Million
SNPs, 449 NATURE 851 (2007). See also Groups Participating in the International HapMap Project,
INT‘L HAPMAP PROJECT, http://snp.cshl.org/groups.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2012).
130. See, e.g., Corrigan, supra note 70, at 145 (providing the example of a 20 million dollar alliance
between the biotech company Genset and the pharmaceutical company Abbott Laboratories ―to analyze
variations in patient responses to particular drug therapies‖).
131. Adam Hedgecoe & Paul Martin, The Drugs Don‟t Work: Expectations and the Shaping of
Pharmacogenetics, 33 SOC. STUD. SCI. 327, 34243 (2003).

Koch.JHCLP.15.2.publisher

280

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 15:263

develop pharmacogenomics tests for gauging drug response. 132 In 1998, deCODE
Genetics and Roche entered into a 200 million dollar agreement ―to identify disease
genes through genetic analysis of the uniquely homogenous Icelandic
population.‖133 Pharmaceutical companies have also been encouraged to enter into
agreements with biotech companies to develop test-drug combinations.134 Such
arrangements are financially desirable because ―[w]here tests and drugs are
intimately linked, as is in the case of new pharmacogenetic products, their
evaluation needs to be co-ordinated and any licensing approval issued in concert‖
rather than separately.135
Even if smaller companies do not enter into collaborations with ―big pharma,‖
the ―existence of ‗niche‘ therapeutic categories will present opportunities for
smaller, genetics-based biotechnology firms to enter the market and produce the
drugs.‖136 It has been hypothesized that the pharmaceutical industry may bifurcate
into two separate sectors: those big pharmaceutical companies that will continue to
pursue ―blockbuster‖ drugs for ―high-prevalence polymorphisms‖ and a ―second
‗cottage‘ sector that serves the ‗orphan drug‘ market.‖137
It will be interesting to see how the pharmaceutical industry adapts and
changes with pharmacogenomic advances. The industry has been ―in a
consolidation and merger phase, with ever larger corporations emerging at a steady
pace.‖138 Since blockbuster drugs may no longer be the preferred treatment,
companies may hone in on ―mini-busters,‖ thereby decreasing their size and the
way they work with one another.139

132. Allen C. Nunnally et al., Intellectual Property and Commercial Aspects of Pharmacogenomics,
in PHARMACOGENOMICS: SOCIAL, ETHICAL, AND CLINICAL DIMENSIONS 109, 127–28 (Mark A.
Rothstein ed., 2003).
133. Id. at 128. deCODE Genetics is an Icelandic company that endeavored to set up an Icelandic
Health Sector Database (HSD) containing the medical records and genealogical and genetic data of all
Icelanders. David E. Winickoff, Genome and Nation: Iceland‟s Health Sector Database and its Legacy,
INNOVATIONS, 80, 80–81 (2006).
134. Companies have ―jumped on the technology, many of them merging with biotech companies
that suddenly see a profitable product in the near future for the first time.‖ Lagay, supra note 35.
135. MELZER ET AL., supra note 48, at 40. Herceptin is one example of a linked test-drug
combination, as it requires administration of a test before it can be prescribed. However, ―[t]he test is not
a true pharmacogenetic test, because it measures protein expression in a tumor rather than the underlying
genetic makeup of the patient, but it shows the power of such tests.‖ Henry, supra note 128.
136. Reeder & Dickson, supra note 90, at 233.
137. Id.
138. Laviero Mancinelli et al., Pharmacogenomics: The Promise of Personalized Medicine, 2 AAPS
PHARMSCI 1, 2 (2000), available at http://www.aapsj.org/articles/ps0201/ps020104/ps020104.pdf.
139. See id. (explaining that the ―one drug fits all‖ approach could evolve into more individualized
efforts, although this may not be a realistic goal); Bryn Williams-Jones & Oonagh Patricia Corrigan,
Rhetoric and Hype: Where‟s the „Ethics‟ in Pharmacogenomics?, 3 AM. J. PHARMACOGENOMICS 375,
379 (2003).
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III. REGULATORY AND LEGAL ISSUES
The utilization of pharmacogenomics in drug development has repercussions
for diverse areas of the law. This section considers the FDA guidance on
pharmacogenomic data submission as well as other FDA measures taken to ensure
the safety and efficacy of pharmacogenomic advancements.140 The impact of the
Orphan Drug Act (ODA) is explored in light of the creation of drug compounds for
small targeted populations.141 This article concludes with a consideration of legal
liability for both physicians and the pharmaceutical industry.142
A. The FDA
Pharmacogenomics introduces new complexities to the already complicated
system of drug development and approval, and it has been argued that
pharmacogenomics will lead to a ―major, technology-driven restructuring‖ which
would require ―bold leadership from relevant regulatory agencies worldwide.‖143
The FDA encourages the incorporation of pharmacogenomics into the drug
development process, and currently the agency has approved 114 drugs with
pharmacogenomic information in their labels. 144
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) 145 authorizes the FDA to ensure
that human and animal drugs, biological products, and therapeutic devices are safe
and effective.146 The drug amendment to the FDCA of 1962 authorized the FDA to
take a more preemptive approach to drug development, requiring premarket
approval for every new drug. 147 Thus, a new drug application (NDA) will only be
approved once the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER), which is
responsible for approving NDAs, is convinced of the drug‘s safety and

140. See infra Part III.A.
141. See infra Part III.B.
142. See infra Part III.C.
143. Evans et al., supra note 75, at 1290.
144. Table of Pharmacogenomic Biomarkers in Drug Labels, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ScienceResearch/ResearchAreas/Pharmacogenetics/ucm083378.htm
(last
updated Feb. 29, 2012). However, critics have noted that the current labeling process may be inadequate,
as the information provided on the labels ―is probably of limited use to most physicians and patients‖
because it does not contain ―clear and comprehensive drug labeling that informs about genetic tests
relevant to the safety or efficacy of use is critical to enhancing patient care.‖ Hudson, supra note 37, at
1036.
145. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2006).
146. The FDA‘s mission is to ―protect public health . . . by helping to speed innovations that make
medicines more effective, safer, and more affordable.‖ What We Do, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN,
http://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/whatwedo/default.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2012).
147. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, §101, 76 Stat. 780, 781. See also John J.
Smith, Regulation of Medical Devices in Radiology: Current Standards and Future Opportunities, 218
RADIOLOGY 329, 330 (2001) (explaining the premarket approval process).
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effectiveness.148 In order to demonstrate safety and efficacy, drug companies spend
millions of dollars and many years enrolling individuals in a series of clinical trials
to generate the necessary data.149 The Office of Clinical Pharmacology in CDER is
charged with reviewing biopharmaceutic, pharmacokinetic, and pharmacodynamic
data in Investigational New Drug (IND) applications and NDAs. 150 After the
pioneer drug‘s patent has expired, FDA can approve abbreviated new drug
applications (ANDAs), for which a generic drug sponsor may establish that the
drug is a bioequivalent to the original product.151
In general, the FDA has taken a wait and see approach to regulating new
technologies. In the late 1990‘s, in response to developments in
pharmacogenomics, the FDA indicated that it planned to maintain the ―drug
approval process as it currently exists,‖ explaining that there is ―no problem with
the promise of pharmacogenomics,‖ and that they were waiting for ―data to
evaluate the results.‖152 As of 1998, the FDA still had no plans to focus any
guidance solely on pharmacogenomics.153 Moreover, the FDA and other agencies
thought it unlikely that pharmacogenomic information would be required for all
drugs.154
1. Voluntary Genomic Data Submissions
Only five years later, in November, 2003, the FDA released its draft guidance
to industry regarding the submission of pharmacogenomic data to the agency. 155

148. How
Drugs
are
Developed
and
Approved,
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN,
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredevelopedandapproved/default.htm
(last visited Apr. 12, 2012).
149. See, e.g., Thomas Bodenheimer, Uneasy Alliance: Clinical Investigators and the
Pharmaceutical Industry, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1539, 1539 (explaining that the FDA mandates that
manufacturers demonstrate their products meet efficacy and safety tests, and the entire process can range
from 300 million to 600 million dollars).
150. Office
of
Clinical
Pharmacology
(OCP),
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/ucm10618
9.htm (last updated Nov. 16, 2011).
151. Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA): Generics, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN,
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredevelopedandapproved/approvalap
plications/abbreviatednewdrugapplicationandagenerics/default.htm (last updated Jan. 3, 2012). One
author has maintained that pharmacogenomics will facilitate the way generic drugs are approved. Lars
Noah, The Coming Pharmacogenomics Revolution: Tailoring Drugs to Fit Patients‟ Genetic Profiles,
43 JURIMETRICS 1, 18 (2002) (―Pharmacogenomic information could, therefore, provide a better basis
for making comparative judgments about bioavailability and facilitate the approval and use of generic
drugs in the future.‖).
152. Binzak, supra note 71, at 105.
153. See John Hodgson & Andrew Marshall, Pharmacogenomics: Will the Regulators Approve?, 16
NATURE BIOTECH. 243, 243 (1998).
154. Id. at 243.
155. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEP‘T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY ON PHARMACOGENOMIC DATA SUBMISSIONS (2003) [hereinafter FDA DRAFT GUIDANCE].
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Lawrence Lesko, the former Director of the Office of Clinical Pharmacology,
stated that the agency has been atypically proactive in issuing its guidance. 156
Although industry often prefers a hands-off approach, the private sector
sought guidance from the FDA regarding the use of pharmacogenomics in its
R&D.157 Stephen Friend, a Senior Vice President at Merck, explained that both
patients and pharmaceutical companies need ―ground rules because the correct use
of this data . . . is going to be critical for it to be of benefit.‖158 In response, the
FDA encouraged drug companies to conduct pharmacogenomic tests during drug
development and to submit resulting data to the FDA, while maintaining an
appropriate level of safety and efficacy for consumers. 159 The draft guidance was
considered quite ―pro-pharmacogenomics,‖ and the FDA stated that the nonbinding
recommendations were intended to ―facilitate,‖ and ―not impede, the use of
pharmacogenomic tests during drug development.‖160 In discussing the draft
guidance, then-FDA Commissioner Mark B. McClellan explained that it was:
[I]ntended to ensure that evolving regulatory policies and study
designs are based on the best science; provide public confidence in
this new field where scientifically appropriate; facilitate the use of
such tests during drug development; and clarify for industry what
types of pharmacogenomic data to submit to FDA. 161
The guidance sought to remedy pharmaceutical sponsors‘ hesitancy in using
pharmacogenomic technologies in drug development by clarifying how the FDA
will use and interpret in the drug application review process. 162

156. Lawrence Lesko, Dir. of the Office of Clinical Pharmacology, Ctr. Drug Evaluation & Res.,
Luncheon Keynote Address at the Scientific American Present: Targeted Medicine: From Concept to
Clinic (Nov. 11, 2004) (transcript available in the Fair Disclosure Wire) [hereinafter Lesko Keynote
Address].
157. Anna Wilde Mathews, FDA Will Issue Rules on New Era of „Personalized Medicine‟, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 3, 2003, at B1 (―Major drug companies are likely to welcome a firm signal from the FDA
that will reduce the questions surrounding the new field. They are also likely to applaud the agency‘s
promise that voluntarily submitted information won‘t be used in decisions about drug approvals.‖).
158. Id.
159. See FDA DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 155 (―The draft guidance is intended to facilitate
scientific progress in the area of pharmacogenomics, which should enable the FDA to use
pharmacogenomic data in regulatory policies and decision making.‖); see also Hampton, supra note 50.
160. Letter from Joanna Waugh, Regulatory Grp. Dir., Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., to the Dockets
Mgmt. Branch (HFA-305) of the Food & Drug Admin. (Feb. 2, 2004) (on file with the Journal of Health
Care Law & Policy).
161. Frank S. Zollmann, FDA Issues Guidance on Pharmacogenomics Data, HUM-MOLGEN (Nov.
5, 2003, 16:28), http://hum-molgen.org/NewsGen/11-2003/000015.html. The draft guidelines were
intended to balance the thin line between: ―(a) accepting correlative data on genotype and drug response
. . . and (b) ensuring that the first experiences evaluating this data will not act as a disincentive for drug
companies embarking on existing and future drug research and development programs.‖ Shah, supra
note 16, at 5.
162. Zollmann, supra note 161.
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In March 2005, the FDA issued its final guidance, which did not vary
significantly from the draft version.163 The fact that the final guidance had been so
delayed led to some skepticism among those that it affects. 164 In late 2004, Lesko
denied that the wait for the final draft was due to a ―big, big problem,‖165 and
attributed the delay to the 2004 political elections, which impeded the collaboration
necessary to issue the final guidance. 166 He also explained that the guidance had
been postponed because it would be released with companion documents, including
a ―roadmap for the voluntary submission process.‖167
The guidance provides a number of examples of places in which the field of
pharmacogenomics has yet to be established or generally accepted by the scientific
community.168 The guidance is therefore intended to motivate the pharmaceutical
industry to pursue pharmacogenomic R&D, allowing industry and the FDA to
become comfortable with novel pharmacogenomic approaches as they develop and
to establish consensus around pharmacogenomics standards and policies. 169
The FDA‘s guidance also provides a ―safe harbor,‖ which asks companies to
voluntarily submit their pharmacogenomic data (―voluntary exploratory data
submissions‖ or VXDSs), in return for the assurance that the agency will not make
premature regulatory decisions based on these submissions. 170 This assurance was a
reaction to companies‘ concerns that data would be used against them to keep their
products off the market or to ―limit [their] approval to a small subpopulation of

163. Press Release, Food & Drug Admin., FDA Works to Speed the Advent of New, More Effective
Personalized Medicine (Mar. 22, 2005). Although there is little obvious difference between the draft and
final guidance, the final version did attempt to resolve ambiguities in the draft version. See FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP‘T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY:
PHARMACOGENOMIC DATA SUBMISSIONS—COMPANION GUIDANCE (2007) (clarifying voluntary
genomic data submissions). In 2007, FDA released companion guidance to the 2005 guidance. Id. The
addendum includes recommendations on gene expression data from microarrays, genotyping, genomic
data in clinical study reports, genomic data from nonclinical toxicology studies, and data submission
formats. Id.
164. See Lesko Keynote Address, supra note 156; Mark Ratner, FDA Pharmacogenomics Guidance
Sends Clear Message to Industry, 4 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 359, 359 (2005) (explaining that
companies awaited the final guidance document for some time).
165. Lesko Keynote Address, supra note 156.
166. Id.
167. Id. Others attributed the delay in part to Mark McClennan‘s departure from his position as
Commissioner of FDA in March 2004. Malorye A. Branca, FDA Issues PGX Guidance, BIO-IT WORLD
(Apr. 15, 2005), http://www.bio-itworld.com/BioIT_Article.aspx?id=39242.
168. See 2005 FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 69, at 3–4 (explaining the scientific uncertainty of
pharmacogenomic test results which make regulatory decision-making difficult, such as probable or
known valid biomarkers, as well as other less well-developed tests that are ―insufficient for making
regulatory decisions‖).
169. See Press Release, Food & Drug Admin., supra note 163.
170. Federico M. Goodsaid et al., Voluntary Exploratory Data Submissions to the US FDA and the
EMA: Experience and Impact, 9 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 435, 435 (2010). VXDSs were
formerly referred to as ―voluntary genomic data submissions‖ or VGDSs. Id.
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patients.‖171 The FDA‘s policy is aimed at encouraging drug companies to share
pharmacogenomic results without fear of the FDA demanding more research. 172
The agency plans to use submitted pharmacogenomic information to ―gain a better
understanding of the field.‖173
The Institutional Pharmacogenomics Review Group (IPRG) was created by
the FDA to set a scientific and regulatory framework for reviewing VXDSs. 174 If it
is unclear whether a submission is voluntary or mandatory, the IPRG is responsible
for convening a meeting with the sponsor and representative(s) from the relevant
review division to help determine the status of the submission in question. 175 The
IPRG reviews voluntary data submissions and also, upon request, consults with
FDA review staff regarding genomic data submissions that are required (per the
relevant regulations) to be submitted to, or as part of, an existing application that
will be used during the regulatory process. 176
The FDA guidance clarifies how submitted data will be utilized in regulatory
decision-making, setting out three classifications of biomarkers: exploratory,
probable valid, and known valid biomarkers. 177 What differentiates the categories is
―their validity or degree of validity,‖ or ―their degree of uncertainty.‖178 Lesko

171. Hampton, supra note 50, at 32. The FDA lists the following as advantages of voluntarily
submitting pharmacogenomic data, including the opportunities for industry to: (1) have informal
meeting with FDA pharmacogenomics experts; (2) ―[r]eceive and benefit from informal peer-review
feedback‖ on pharmacogenomics issues and/or questions; (3) ―[g]ain insight into current FDA thinking‖
about pharmacogenomics that may assist in reach strategic decisions; and (4) familiarize FDA with
pharmacogenomics experiments, data analysis and interpretation approaches. Genomics: Frequently
Asked
Questions,
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ScienceResearch/ResearchAreas/Pharmacogenetics/ucm083893.htm
(last
visited April 13, 2012).
172. See Mathews, supra note 157 (noting that the FDA may ask ―companies to voluntarily submit
more general research in pharmacogenomics‖); see also Richard Fisler, Biomarkers in Clinical
Development: Implications for Personalized Medicine and Streamlining R&D, ADVANCES LIFE
SCIENCES REPORT 16 (2005) (explaining that many companies fear a delay in approval of their product
due to FDA questioning).
173. Such knowledge is ―important, because there‘s a lot of uncertainty about the significance of
data in these areas,‖ according to the director of regulatory affairs of a large pharmaceutical company.
Mathews, supra note 157.
174. Interdisciplinary Pharmacogenomics Review Group (IPRG), FOOD & DRUG ADMIN,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ScienceResearch/ResearchAreas/Pharmacogenetics/ucm083889.htm
(last
updated July 27, 2010).
175. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MANUAL OF POLICIES
AND PROCEDURES: MANAGEMENT OF THE INTERDISCIPLINARY PHARMACOGENOMICS REVIEW GROUP
(IPRG) 1–3 (2005) [hereinafter MANUAL OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES].
176. Id. at 2–3.
177. 2005 FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 69, at 4 (explaining ―when the data will be considered
sufficiently reliable to serve as the basis for regulatory decision making; when it will be considered only
supportive to a decision; and when the data will not be used in regulatory decision making.‖).
178. Lesko Keynote Address, supra note 156. See 2005 FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 69, at 4
(distinguishing between known valid biomarkers, which are accepted in the broad scientific community,
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explained that ―the function is driven by the classification, and then the function in
turn drives the submission process, whether it is voluntary or required and whether
it is a full report, abbreviated or synopsis.‖179 The guidance informs drug sponsors
on when and how to submit pharmacogenomic data ―during the drug or biological
drug product development and review processes,‖ what format and content must be
submitted, and how the data will, or will not, be used in regulatory decision
making.180 Moreover, although the submission of pharmacogenomic data is
generally voluntary, the FDA guidance recommends that tests and drugs be codeveloped, and all information submitted to the agency; 181 this way a drug sponsor
can ―fully integrate pharmacogenomic data into the drug development program.‖182
Thus, in issuing its pharmacogenomics-related guidance, the FDA sought to
remain consistent with existing agency policy. 183 Mandatory genomic data
submissions continue to be processed according to standard processing for routine
application submissions.184 Moreover, the FDA provides detailed instructions for
determining when a drug company is required to submit pharmacogenomic data for
an IND.185 For example, if data is submitted to a known valid biomarker, the
information must be submitted pursuant to 21 C.F.R. § 312.23.186 The FDA
guidance provides a unique submission algorithm for each category because FDA
regulations enunciate different requirements for INDs, unapproved NDAs and
Biologics License Applications (BLAs), and approved NDAs and BLAs. 187

and probable valid biomarkers, which appear to have predictive value but may not yet be widely
accepted).
179. Lesko Keynote Address, supra note 156.
180. 2005 FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 69, at 1.
181. Id. at 6.
182. Id.; see Hampton, supra note 50, at 33 (explaining that collaboration between the FDA and the
pharmaceutical industry is important from a clinical perspective).
183. 2005 FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 69, at 3.
184. MANUAL OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, supra note 175, at 2.
185. 2005 FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 69, at 19–20. A company must submit a full report if:
1. The test results are used for making decisions pertaining to a specific clinical trial, or
in an animal trial used to support safety (e.g., the results will affect dose selection, entry
criteria into a clinical trial safety monitoring, or subject stratification).
2. A sponsor is using the test results to support scientific arguments pertaining to, for
example, the pharmacologic mechanism of action, the selection of drug dosing or the
safety and effectiveness of a drug.
3. The test results constitute a known, valid biomarker for physiologic, pathophysiologic,
pharmacologic, toxicologic, or clinical states or outcomes in humans, or is a known valid
biomarker for a safety outcome in animal studies or a probable valid biomarker in human
safety studies. If the information on the biomarker (example, human CYP2D6 status) is
not being used for purposes 1 or 2 above, the information can be submitted to the IND as
an abbreviated report.
Id.
186. Id. at 24.
187. Id. at 8–12 (explaining the algorithms in Section IV of the report).
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Lesko predicted that the relation between submission format and which
definition will apply to biomarkers within the ―hierarchy‖ the guidance provides
would be one of the most contentious issues with the guidance. 188 Many claimed
that the definitions in the guidance were unclear, and ―you need[ed] a lot of specific
examples to walk through them, either with a sponsor or with a review division at
FDA.‖189 Most likely in response, the FDA published Quick Reference materials,
which contain a series of decision trees to make the process as clear as possible. 190
The guide provides a simple table for determining when data is required to be
submitted and when it may be submitted voluntarily. 191 To clarify further, the FDA
also issued an attachment to the guidance, providing prototypical examples of
voluntary and required submissions. 192
Reactions to the guidance have been generally positive. 193 In the first five
years after its release, the agency received more than 40 VXDSs, resulting in more
than 35 meetings between the FDA and industry sponsors. 194 However, FDA
representatives assert that ―[i]ndustry sponsors have not fully embraced the
[VXDS] concept as evidenced by the fact that numerous major pharmaceutical and
biotechnology companies have never submitted a [VXDS] to the FDA.‖195
2. Other FDA Approaches
Pharmacogenomics has impacted the way entities that determine licensing
and prescription of new drugs interact with entities that regulate and approve linked

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Lesko Keynote Address, supra note 156.
Id.
See 2005 FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 69, at 19–24.
Id. at 24.
See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP‘T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ATTACHMENT TO
GUIDANCE ON PHARMACOGENOMIC DATA SUBMISSIONS: EXAMPLES OF VOLUNTARY SUBMISSIONS OR
SUBMISSIONS REQUIRED UNDER 21 CFR 312, 314, OR 601 (2005). However, some issues were not
clarified–for example, how pharmacogenomics may affect how drugs will be classified as orphan drugs
under the Orphan Drug Act of 1983. NAT‘L INST. HEALTH, NIH COMMENTS ON FDA‘S DRAFT
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY PHARMACOGENOMIC DATA SUBMISSION 2 (2004).
193. Goodsaid et al., supra note 170, at 435 (VXDSs have ―a positive impact on the content of
biomarker data in subsequent regulatory applications‖ and ―industry is successfully integrating novel
biomarker data in drug development.‖).
194. Id. at 435. Goodsaid et al. note:
VXDS meetings have led to mutually beneficial and effective interactions between the
FDA, the [European Medicines Agency], and sponsors of VXDSs (pharmaceutical
companies, technology providers and academic researchers). Because of the importance of
biomarker strategies and pharmacogenetics in drug development, as enumerated by the
FDA‘s Critical Path Initiative, the VXDS process is likely to adapt to meet the changing
and growing needs of both the regulatory agencies and VXDS sponsors.
Id. at 444.
195. Lesko & Zineh, supra note 21, at 508 (explaining this reluctance may be based on ―residual
apprehension about the FDA review of voluntary genomic data, confusion over the requirements of a
voluntary submission versus a required submission or the perception that it is not worth the time or
effort to prepare and submit a [VXDS]‖).
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tests and other medical devices.196 For example, the FDA established the Office of
Combination Products to ―streamline the processing of complex drug-device, drugbiologic, and device-biologic combination products that play an increasingly
significant role in health care.‖197 Moreover, as part of the Critical Path Initiative,
an effort to ―stimulate and facilitate the modernization of the sciences through
which regulated products are developed, evaluated, and manufactured,‖ the FDA
has attempted to clarify co-development of pharmacogenomic-based therapeutic
drugs and associated diagnostic tests. 198 In April 2005, the FDA released its draft
Drug-Diagnostic Co-Development Concept Paper, which directly addresses drugs
that require a genetic test before the drug is administered. 199 It provides guidance
regarding whether the therapy and diagnostic are required to be co-developed,
approved together, or considered a combination product.200
There are a number of additional ways in which the FDA could address the
various implications of pharmacogenomics. The FDA‘s 2005 guidance indicates
that the agency is committed to educating the pharmaceutical industry about how
pharmacogenomic data can be submitted to help a drug through the approval
process.201 The FDA has set up a number of workshops focusing on the integration
of genomics and diagnostics into the drug development process. 202 Moreover,
because the agency is concerned that FDA officials may not be prepared to deal
with the number of INDs and NDAs containing genomic information that may be
submitted, the FDA has sponsored a number of internal educational programs. 203

196. Shah, supra note 16, at 7.
197. Press Release, Food & Drug Admin., FDA Establishes Office of Combination Products (Dec.
31, 2002).
198. Pharmacogenomics and its Role in Drug Safety, 1 FDA DRUG SAFETY NEWSLETTER (Food &
Drug Admin., Silver Spring, MD), Winter 2008, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/
DrugSafetyNewsletter/ucm119991.htm.
199. Food & Drug Admin., Drug-Diagnostic Co-Development Concept Paper 1 (Apr. 2005)
(unpublished
draft),
www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/ScienceResearch/ResearchAreas/
Pharmacogenetics/UCM116689.pdf.
200. Id. at 1–5.
201. See 2005 FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 69, at 2–3, 14–16 (noting that with the guidance the FDA
hopes to ―clarify‖ its policy in terms of how pharmacogenomic testing will be used in the drug
application review process).
202. See id. at 3 (indicating that in May 2002, the Agency and pharmaceutical industry groups held
workshops to discuss the important issues surrounding ―the application of pharmacogenetics and
pharmacogenomics to drug development‖).
203. See Lesko Keynote Address, supra note 156. In his keynote address, Lesko indicated that:
[The FDA has sponsored] a number of educational programs for people in the center to
raise their awareness level and better prepare them for the applications they‘re going to
see. And they are going to see them because already we can see a significant increase in
the number of INDs and NDAs coming in that contain genomic information, and we have
to get a readiness in the staff.
Id.
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The FDA also has hosted a lecture series designed for scientists and created a new
training program on genomics for review staff. 204
Instituting more safeguards throughout the FDA approval process—for
example, by requiring genetics experts on IRBs—may ensure that the increasing
use of pharmacogenomics is encouraged while ensuring appropriate research
participant protections.205 Another option is to build in-house regulatory expertise
to monitor evolving regulations and to help the FDA determine how the regulatory
process should apply to pharmacogenomics. 206
a. Increased Phase IV Monitoring
In order to further regulate pharmacogenomics, the FDA may also require
increased monitoring during phase IV trials, which take place after the drug or
treatment has been licensed and marketed.207 The use of pharmacogenomics in
premarketing studies may call for a greater focus on postmarketing surveillance. 208
Since the premarket trial population will likely be small relative to current clinical
studies, potential ADRs may not be identified as readily.209 Thus, continued postmarketing monitoring would allow a larger trial population than in the
premarketing clinical trials, although use of the drug after FDA approval is not as
controlled as during the approval process.210

204. Presentations on Genomics: FDA Genomics Group Presentations in 2010-2011, FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ScienceResearch/ResearchAreas/Pharmacogenetics/ucm085427.htm
(last updated Sept. 27, 2011).
205. Binzak, supra note 72, at 115–16.
206. See SEC‘Y‘S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH & SOC‘Y, U.S. DEP‘T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., REALIZING THE POTENTIAL OF PHARMACOGENOMICS: OPPORTUNITIES AND
CHALLENGES 78 (2008) (explaining that because limited awareness about the impacts of
pharmacogenetics by health care decision-makers could harm the advancement of the technologies,
regulating bodies like the FDA must have adequate in-house expertise in pharmacogenetics).
207. Phase IV clinical trials are conducted in order to glean additional information regarding the
drug‘s risks, benefits, and optimal use. See 21 U.S.C. § 356a(b) (2006) (providing authority for
monitoring the progress of post-marketing studies that drug and biologic applicants have agreed to
conduct).
208. Noah, supra note 151, at 24 (―Because of the inherent limitations of clinical trials,
pharmacogenomic interventions will not alter the existing need for postmarket surveillance . . . .‖). One
author recommends a more formal (and therefore more costly) phase IV system because of the smaller
premarketing trials that will be a result of pharmacogenomics. Shah, supra note 16, at 7.
209. See Binzak, supra note 71, at 125–26 (noting the difficulty in detecting adverse drug responses
in a phase III trial, in which only several thousand people may be included).
210. Postmarketing
Surveillance
Programs,
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Surveillance/ucm090385.htm
(last visited Mar. 24, 2012) (noting that postmarketing surveillance is critical because all of a drug‘s
possible side effects cannot be determined based on preapproval studies that involve a maximum of
several thousand patients and sometimes only several hundred). See also OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT,
POSTMARKETING SURVEILLANCE OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 18 (1982) (noting that while clinical trials
are conducted under strict rules, effects of a drug administered by a regular physician or outpatient clinic
is not as controlled and cannot be fully assessed).
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As phase IV trials become more indispensable for ensuring safety and
efficacy, the Office of Post-Marketing Drug Risk Assessment, which is responsible
for conducting epidemiological studies involving possible adverse outcomes, might
be in the best position to regulate postmarketing surveillance. 211 Critics argue that
the FDA must be more ―proactive‖ in ―considering how it is going to regulate the
new pharmacogenomic drugs already being developed.‖212 However, increased
focus on phase IV trials may stretch the FDA‘s scarce resources even further. 213 In
2002, the FDA reported that, of its 2400 postmarketing NDA commitments, only
882 had been completed.214
Alternatively, the FDA may consider requiring drug developers that, in
postmarketing surveillance, find that the number of ADRs is above a certain
threshold set by FDA to perform pharmacogenomic studies of the drug or submit to
withdrawal from the market.215 One critic claims that this could benefit drug
manufacturers as well, because:
ADR studies could serve as an additional revenue stream in which the
manufacturer could secure intellectual property rights in any
pharmacogenetics test derived from its ADR studies and may avoid a
complete withdrawal of its drug from the market by labeling changes
that would permit the screening out of patients at risk from the drug. 216
However, one concern with shifting the focus to greater surveillance after
FDA approval is that it might be dangerous to leave adverse event surveillance and
reporting until a drug is already on the market. Doing so might potentially defeat
the FDA mandate to ensure safety and efficacy by allowing the product onto the
market before it has been fully demonstrated to be safe. 217

211. Mark A. Rothstein, Epilogue: Policy Prescriptions, in PHARMACOGENOMICS: SOCIAL,
ETHICAL, AND CLINICAL DIMENSIONS 319, 324 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 2003). FDA has authority to
withdraw a drug from the market due to postmarketing study results. Id. at 325.
212. Binzak, supra note 71, at 107.
213. Charles Steenburg, The Food and Drug Administration‟s Use of Postmarketing (Phase IV)
Study Requirements: Exception to the Rule?, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 295, 380 (2006) (noting that the
resources of the agency ―are limited . . . particularly in the case of postapproval activities‖).
214. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REPORT TO CONGRESS: REPORTS ON POSTMARKETING STUDIES 10
(2002),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/ucm/groups/fdagov-public/@fdagov-drugsgen/documents/document/ucm071529.pdf.
215. Wu, supra note 34, at 745–46.
216. Id. at 746.
217. See Rena Steinzor & Margaret Clune, The Hidden Lesson of the Vioxx Fiasco: Reviving a
Hollow FDA, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM WHITE PAPER NO. 514, Oct. 2005, at 11, 1718
(highlighting the importance of pre-market drug safety reviews and how speeding up drug approvals can
increase post-marketing risks).
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b. Off-Label Use
An issue of major concern to the FDA is the problem of off-label
prescription.218 Drugs are only FDA-approved for use in the permitted population,
and drug companies are prohibited from encouraging off-label use.219 However,
physicians are not subject to the FDA prohibition, because the agency does not
regulate the practice of medicine. 220 Thus, physicians are allowed to prescribe
drugs for off-label use,221 which arguably ensures ―clinical freedom‖ and fosters
innovation, leading to the development of new treatments. 222 The use of smaller,
more targeted trial samples in clinical studies may have enormous implications
once the drug is on the market, because the number of individuals for whom use of
the drug would be off-label would potentially increase as the approved population
shrinks.223 Further, because off-label use might be more dangerous for compounds
developed via pharmacogenomics research than for other one-size-fits-all
blockbuster drugs due to the risk of adverse drug reactions, it might be necessary to
require more safeguards for off-label usage in the future.
Potential solutions to the augmented problem of off-label use exist and could
be implemented alone or jointly. One option would require study groups to
encompass more varied genotypes.224 This would extend required clinical studies
on special populations prior to a drug‘s approval, because small premarket targeted
studies will mean that those with dissimilar genomes will not otherwise have been
tested for adverse events.225 However, increasing the size of trial populations might
directly counteract the benefit that pharmacogenomics presents for clinical trials,

218. The FDA has released multiple guidance documents on the topic. See, e.g., “Off-Label” and
Investigational Use of Marketed Drugs, Biologics and Medical Devices – Information Sheet, FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN, http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm126486.htm (last updated
Aug. 20, 2011) [hereinafter Information Sheet]; Office of the Comm‘r, Food & Drug Admin, Guidance
for Industry: Good Reprint Practices for the Distribution of Medical Journal Articles and Medical or
Scientific Reference Publications on Unapproved New Uses of Approved Drugs and Approved or
Cleared
Medical
Devices
(Jan.
2009),
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm125126.htm [hereinafter Good Reprint
Practices]; see also Off-label but Not Unregulated, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2011, at A14 (discussing the
government‘s approach to off-label uses).
219. Good Reprint Practices, supra note 218.
220. Information Sheet, supra note 218.
221. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 345, 369 (2007).
222. MELZER ET AL., supra note 49, at 51.
223. Id. at 12; see also Randall S. Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Drug Use – Rethinking the Role of
the FDA, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1427, 1427–28 (2008) (noting that there has been no formal evaluation
of off-label uses of drugs and evidence for a clinical situation might not apply to other situations).
224. MELZER ET AL., supra note 48, at 41 (recommending that a larger safety file than just the
genotypic subgroup be required).
225. Id.
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thereby negating the efficiency and safety advantages offered by the field. 226 Some
critics have also recommended that DNA samples be collected as part of adverse
event reporting.227 This information could then be made available to the academic
community for further research and analysis, to gauge if the compound is safe for
use in the broader population. Alternatively, the FDA could offer a new class of
conditional approvals for drugs targeted to particular subpopulations. 228
Moreover, physician education might be necessary regarding the dangerous
consequences of off-label prescription for genetically-targeted drugs, while
maintaining the legality of off-label prescribing.229 A final option, which will be
discussed in more depth in section III.C, is to impose stricter liability on physicians
who prescribe pharmacogenomics products off-label, resulting in harm to the
patient.230
B. The Orphan Drug Act
The often-cited ―orphan drug problem‖ refers to industry‘s reluctance, in light
of financial limitations, to develop drugs for diseases that affect small segments of
the patient population.231 Pharmacogenomics intensifies this problem because it
divides patient populations into smaller subpopulations, thereby disincentivizing
the development of new drugs for these discrete groups.232 Thus, economic
―incentives for research may be weakest precisely where improved targeting is
most needed.‖233
In 1983, Congress passed the Orphan Drug Act (ODA) to provide incentives
for developing drugs for small markets.234 The ODA focuses on the 25 to 30

226. Id. at 46 (noting that pharmacogenomics will allow the more efficient and quicker development
of compounds because of smaller trial samples and more predictable outcomes).
227. Id. at 53.
228. Id. at 41 (―[A] more flexible approach offering ‗conditional‘ approvals could be appropriate
here.‖).
229. The education of physicians will be discussed in more detail in the section on physician
liability. See infra Part III.C.1.
230. See infra note 296 and accompanying text.
231. Richard Y. Cheung et al., Orphan Drug Policies: Implications for the United States, Canada,
and Developing Countries, 12 HEALTH L.J. 183, 184 (2004) (identifying the increased cost of drug
development as the reason for the pharmaceutical industry‘s focus on drugs addressing common
diseases). The problem has also been described as ―the possibility of focusing on ‗easier to treat‘ subsets
of the population and excluding from trials those with unfavourable, or simply unusual, genetic
constitutions.‖ Goldstein et al., supra note 10, at 945.
232. Buckley & McKinnon, supra note 69, at 23. See also Thomas Morrow, Orphan Drug Act
Treatments Deserve Full Insurance Coverage, MANAGED CARE MAG. (Sept. 2004),
http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/0409/0409.biotech.html (exclaiming that, because of this
stratification ―[w]e may all soon be orphans‖).
233. Evans et al., supra note 75, at 1289.
234. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa, 360bb, 360cc, 360dd (2006) (codifying the Orphan Drug Act); 21
C.F.R. § 316 (2011); see also Morrow, supra note 232 (crediting the Orphan Drug Act with
incentivizing pharmaceutical companies to research and develop drugs for small populations); Enrique
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million Americans with one of almost 7,000 rare—or ―orphan‖—diseases.235
Currently, orphan drug status applies to drugs that are effective for fewer than
200,000 patients or those that affect a greater number, but for which ―there is no
reasonable expectation that the cost of developing and making available in the
United States a drug for such disease or condition will be recovered from sales in
the United States of such drug.‖236 Patient population is determined by the total
number of individuals with clinical symptoms, rather than those who would
actually be eligible for use of the drug. 237 This definition has great implications for
products developed using pharmacogenomics.
Specifically, the ODA: (1) grants the sponsoring organization seven years of
marketing exclusivity, beginning on the date of FDA approval for the designated
orphan indication;238 (2) gives a 50 percent tax credit toward the financing of
clinical trials in humans;239 and (3) provides grants up to 150,000 dollars for phase
I studies and up to 300,000 dollars for Phase II and III studies. 240 Through
exclusivity incentives, drug developers may recover the costs of investing in
expensive orphan genotypes.241 The FDA often grants priority review for orphan
drugs, and therapies may also be considered for a rapid approval under the special
accelerated process.242

Seoane-Vazquez et al., Incentives for Orphan Drug Research and Development in the United States, 3
ORPHANET J. RARE DISEASES 33, 33 (2008) (stating that the Orphan Drug Act was enacted to facilitate
development and marketing of orphan drugs). In October 2011, HHS proposed modifications to the
ODA regulations. See Orphan Drug Regulations, 76 Fed. Reg. 64868 (proposed Oct. 19, 2011)
(proposing changes to the Orphan Drug Act like specific subsets of orphan designations).
235. PHARM. RESEARCH & MFG. AM., 2011 REPORT: ORPHAN DRUGS IN DEVELOPMENT FOR RARE
DISEASES 1 (2011).
236. 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2) (2006).
237. Buckley & McKinnon, supra note 69, at 23.
238. 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a)(2) (2006). See also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP‘T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., THE ORPHAN DRUG ACT: IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT 1 (2001) [hereinafter THE
ORPHAN DRUG ACT]. This contrasts with the five years granted by the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984.
Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug Development
Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 189 (1999).
239. 26 U.S.C. § 45C(a) (2006). See also THE ORPHAN DRUG ACT, supra note 238, at 1.
240. 21 U.S.C. § 360ee (2006). See also THE ORPHAN DRUG ACT, supra note 238, at 1; Morrow,
supra note 240,
241. Wu, supra note 34, at 745 (―Exclusivity may include barring other drug developers from
submitting competing drug applications. Moreover, exclusivity may include extending prescription drug
benefits to cover drugs for orphan genotypes while denying or limiting coverage for competing drugs.‖).
See also Paul V. Buday, Hints on Preparing Successful Orphan Drug Designation Requests, 51 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 75, 7677 (1996) (detailing the incentives for developing orphan drugs).
242. Buday, supra note 241, at 76 & n.11 (discussing approval times for orphan drugs). In 1997,
Congress waived the usual drug application fee charged by the FDA for orphan drugs, amounting to
approximately 500,000 dollar savings to drug developers. Morrow, supra note 232.
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The ODA, sometimes called one of most successful laws Congress has ever
written,243 enabled FDA not only to oversee drug development, but to take an
active role.244 The Act is responsible for the largest single source of clinical grants
from the FDA: in 2010, FDA awarded approximately 14 million dollars in grants
for orphan drugs, funding 22 new grants and approximately 40 other ongoing
clinical study projects.245 Since the passage of the ODA, 350 drugs for orphan
diseases have received FDA approval.246 In contrast, in the decade before the
ODA‘s passage, less than ten drugs and biological products for rare diseases were
brought to market.247 Further, ―orphan drug product designations more than
doubled‖ in the first decade of the twenty-first century.248 Notably, approximately
50 percent of the biologics approved for marketing in the U.S. since 1982 have
been designated orphan drugs. 249
Not all pharmacogenomic products will attain orphan drug status under the
ODA. Although it is ―anticipated by industry that subgroups of patients, defined by
genotype would qualify,‖ orphan status may not be certain, ―particularly where the
target population is only a subgroup of the disease indication.‖250 A drug‘s patient
population is generally defined according to the total expected treatment
population, not just those whom the pharmaceutical company identifies as eligible
for clinical trials.251 Thus, Herceptin, which is often cited as a rational model for
pharmacogenomics, was refused orphan status by the FDA for metastatic breast
cancer because the agency disagreed with the drug sponsor‘s interpretation of the
size of the target population.252 The Office of Orphan Products Development

243. Marlene E. Haffner et al., Two Decades of Orphan Product Development, 1 NATURE REVS.
DRUG DISCOVERY 821, 821 (2002).
244. Morrow, supra note 232.
245. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FY 2011 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET REQUEST 120, 122 (2010).
246. Office of Orphan Prod. Dev., Developing Products for Rare Diseases & Conditions, FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/orphan/designat/allap.rtf (last updated March 20, 2012).
247. Id.
248. Tufts Ctr. for the Study of Drug Dev., U.S. Orphan Product Designations More Than Doubled
from 2000-02 to 2006-08, 12 IMPACT REP., no. 1, 2010 at 1.
249. Morrow, supra note 232. However, managed care organizations have been hesitant to cover
drugs approved via the orphan drug process, suggesting that the drugs are ―less ‗proven‘ than those
developed through traditional pathways.‖ Id. One reason they cite is that double blind randomized
controlled studies are often not possible because of the dearth of patients. Id. One alternative to such
studies is historic-control trials. Morrow cites the approval of an enzyme which demonstrated efficacy in
treating severe combined immunodeficiency (SCID) as a prime example of a historic-control study,
which only had six patients enrolled in its pivotal trial. Id.
250. MELZER ET AL., supra note 48, at 41.
251. Mignon Fogarty, Up for Adoption: Pharmacogenetics and the Orphan Drug Law (Dec. 11,
1998), http://acor.org/sgreene/hmsbeagle/html/content/44/people/op_ed.htm.
252. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 14, at 52 (indicating that the FDA considered
Herceptin‘s limited patient population of approximately 165,000 U.S. women with metastatic breast
cancer as insufficient and opining that the FDA tries to restrict those drugs that obtain orphan
designation to prevent pharmaceutical companies from dividing the market for economic benefit).
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(OOPD) defended its decision not to grant the drug orphan drug status and
explained that pharmacogenomic products would not be treated differently than
other orphan drug submissions.253
However, many support the expansion of the ODA to apply to subpopulations
identified via pharmacogenomic discoveries. 254 To rectify the possibility that
stratification of patients by their genetic makeup will lead to a dearth of treatments
for those groups, the British Nuffield Council on Bioethics recommends that
regulatory agencies prepare guidance that ―use existing orphan medicine
legislation, or any other policy instrument with equivalent effect, to provide
incentives for development.‖255 It has been suggested that Congress be encouraged
to consider making the ODA more flexible and extending resources to the FDA to
support the development of drugs for orphan genotypes. 256
Application of the ODA, although incentivizing pharmacogenomic research
by drug companies, gives rise to distributive justice questions related to the
allocation of scarce research resources between different orphan disease groups. 257
One critic recommends supplementing ―moral theory with transparent, wellreasoned political debate‖ and advocates cost-benefit analysis in order to give
preferential treatment to those drugs that are considered cost-beneficial.258
C. Legal Liability
As pharmacogenomic discoveries enter the market, higher diagnostic and
prescription precision will likely lead to better matching between patients and the
appropriate drugs, a reduction or elimination of adverse effects, and more targeted
dosaging according to one‘s individual metabolism.259 However, because of these
advances, adverse events or ineffective treatments will be scrutinized. Who will
bear the liability for side effects or unsuccessful therapies? Increased liability may
encourage more diligence on both physicians and pharmaceutical manufacturers‘

253. Jai Shah, Economic and Regulatory Considerations in Pharmacogenomics for Drug Licensing
and Healthcare, 21 NATURE BIOTECH. 747, 749 (2003). Note that regardless of orphan drug status,
Herceptin has become profitable. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, PHARMACOGENETICS: ETHICAL
ISSUES CONSULTATION PAPER 10 (2003). However, it is not clear that this will be true for other drugs
with smaller patient populations. Id.
254. See Greely, supra note 22, at 8.
255. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 14, at xix.
256. Rothstein, supra note 211, at 324 (encouraging increased funding for translational research to
facilitate further innovation).
257. Arti K. Rai, Pharmacogenetic Interventions, Orphan Drugs, and Distributive Justice: The Role
of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 19 J. SOCIAL PHIL. & POL‘Y, July 2002, at 246, 248.
258. See id. at 270.
259. See Teresa Kelton, Pharmacogenomics: The Re-Discovery of the Concept of Tailored Drug
Therapy and Personalized Medicine, 19 HEALTH LAWYER, Jan. 2007, at 1, 3 (describing the benefits of
pharmacogenomic-based diagnostics).
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parts. Often, the choice of defendant depends on who has the deeper pockets. 260
Additionally, in the pharmacogenomic context, the choice of defendant may depend
on whether advertising is direct-to-consumer or whether there is a third party
intermediary.
There is currently little liability attached to mistakes related to drug
prescription due to the presumption in law and ethics that medicine is ―inherently
imprecise‖ compared to other types of science. 261 This presumption may have a
deterrent effect on drug companies from developing targeted, more precise
pharmacogenomic products. Because the law‘s ―special rules‖ regarding medicine
may be based on outdated presumptions, they may necessitate evolution and
modification.262
One hindrance to holding a physician or drug company liable for deleterious
drug effects or lack of efficacious treatment is the problem of demonstrating
causation.263 Causation of an adverse event by a particular drug may be difficult to
prove because of the complexities of environmental interactions, coupled with
other possible causative factors. Moreover, defendants may use genetic discoveries
to establish alternative causes for the adverse events for which they are being held
responsible, using genetic information to demonstrate that the individual would
have developed the illness regardless of the drug‘s effect.264 The defendants could
use an individual‘s genetic susceptibility to an illness to demonstrate that they have
no duty to protect ―hypersensitive individuals.‖265

260. See Steven S. Gensler, Prejudice, Confusion, and the Bifurcated Civil Jury Trial: Lessons From
Tennessee, 67 TENN. L. REV. 653, 661–62 (2000) (pointing out that courts often instill procedural
safeguards to prevent net worth evidence from becoming a factor).
261. Evans et al., supra note 75, at 1289 (comparing the implied warranties of appliances to the
vague and imprecise nature of medicine). One of the authors‘ recommendations to incentivize
pharmacogenomic research include reversing state statutes and court doctrines ―that have long shielded
medical product manufacturers from refund obligations.‖ Id. at 1290.
262. Id.
263. ―The elements of a negligence claim are: (1) a duty of care owed by the defendant to the
plaintiff, (2) breach of that duty through conduct that fails to meet the applicable standard of care, (3)
harm or injury, and (4) a causal link between the injury and the breach of duty.‖ Sharona Hoffman,
Responders‟ Responsibility: Liability and Immunity in Public Health Emergencies, 96 GEO. L.J. 1913,
1926 (2008).
264. See Gary E. Marchant, Genomics and Toxic Substances: Part II – Genetic Susceptibility to
Environmental Agents, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10641, 10648 (2003). For example, a ―defendant could also
argue that the plaintiff‘s disease resulted solely from his or her genetic predisposition, which caused the
disease to develop independent of any exposure to the defendant‘s product.‖ Id. Genetic test could
demonstrate that a person‘s predisposition decreased susceptibility to a disease, thereby providing a
useful defense against causation. A defendant could also ―seek to test the plaintiff for other genetic
variants that provide increased resilience to the toxic agent at issue, which would make that person less
susceptible than the average person.‖ Id.
265. Id. Marchant provides:
In particular, defendants could assert what has sometimes been described as the
―idiosyncratic response‖ defense. This defense protects from liability a defendant whose
product or activity is harmless to the general public but may injure a small number of
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Further, because of the complexity of genetic information, and the ―perils
inherent in broad statistical judgments based on science that will be inexact even in
the best scenario,‖ it will often be impossible to demonstrate a simple cause and
effect relationship between one‘s genetic profile and the disease or side effects one
exhibits.266 It is clear that not all tests are completely accurate, and the more
complicated the gene interactions, the less accurate any prescription might be.
1. Individual Liability
Pharmacogenomics could be a double-edged sword, where physicians are
penalized for either prescribing or withholding pharmacogenomically-developed
drugs and treatments.267 It is unclear whether physicians will have an obligation to
utilize pharmacogenomic diagnostics to hone an individual‘s prescription to his or
her genetic profile, or whether doctors can continue to follow the status quo in
diagnosing and prescribing medicines. 268 For example, a patient could sue his or
her doctor for adverse events associated with a prescription given according to
currently accepted standards, which may not have kept pace with scientific
innovations. Will there be liability for not testing for genetic predispositions or
using a particular treatment?
A patient could ostensibly sue a physician for medical malpractice claiming
that he or she refused to prescribe a drug (perhaps off-label) because it was not
approved for his or her exact genetic makeup (i.e., he or she did not have the
genetic predisposition of those involved in the clinical studies). 269 Under the current
liability regime, physicians may be sued for malpractice for negligent prescription
of drugs, and courts have found doctors liable for failing to test for and prescribe
the most appropriate drug for a particular individual. 270 Pharmacogenomic
discoveries may therefore render adverse effects more predictable than for other

individuals with a unique and unusual susceptibility. This defense has generally been
applied in cases where a plaintiff developed a rare allergenic response to a cosmetic or
similar product, but the defense would presumably also apply to cases where a plaintiff
was harmed due to a rare genetic susceptibility to a product that is otherwise harmless to
the general population.
Id. Marchant continues, ―[t]he formal justification for this defense is that the hyper-susceptibility of the
plaintiff, rather than some defect in the product, is the proximate cause of the plaintiff‘s injury.‖ Id.
266. Evans et al., supra note 75, at 1290.
267. See Mark A. Rothstein, Liability Issues in Pharmacogenomics, 66 LA. L. REV. 117, 121–22,
124 (2005) (detailing the need to provide the best care to patients while protecting themselves from
liability in the new venture of pharmacogenomics).
268. See id. at 122 (indicating the possibility of potential liability in the future for failure to utilize
newer, more individualized medication).
269. See Rothstein, supra note 267, at 122.
270. See Noah, supra note 151, at 24 & n.12.
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drugs,271 and physicians may consequently be subject to stricter medical liability
for off-label prescription of pharmacogenomics products.272
Because of the probabilistic nature of genetics, it is unclear how high a
possibility of a drug not working or having deleterious effects would be necessary
to justify denial of treatment.273 If there is only a single available treatment, the
threshold for refusing it may be higher than if there are multiple treatments from
which to choose.274 Some critics recommend greater liability for negative outcomes
or ineffective treatment results, worrying that there is the possibility that ―[p]eople
receiving a ‗negative‘ test result will be denied a (more remote) chance of the drug
working for them. Where there are no alternatives this may cause conflict.‖275 They
have called for new ―standards to limit lawsuits against providers who deny
treatments based on careful, evidence-based inferences that the therapy, if
administered, would not work.‖276
2. Liability Against Pharmaceutical Companies
Pharmaceutical companies may also face liability for faulty products or for
failure to warn consumers directly of the possible ADRs associated with their
products.277 Once a patient is warned of the possibility of ADRs related to one‘s
genetic predisposition, however, it could be argued that the patient has assumed the
risk and may therefore not recover if he or she experiences an adverse reaction. 278
To support a product liability claim, a plaintiff could also allege that the
failure to use pharmacogenomic technologies resulted in a marketing or design
defect.279 Because of the state of the technology, however, the required expert

271. See Giovanni Severino & Maria Del Zompo, Adverse Drug Reactions: Role of
Pharmacogenomics, 49 PHARMACOLOGICAL RES. 363, 367, 370–71 (2004) (explaining that
pharmacogenomics provides a ―plausible basis‖ for predictive testing as well as enhanced understanding
of potentially fatal adverse drug reactions).
272. See Tilo Mandry, Legal Implications of Pharmacogenomics Regarding Drug Trials, Drug
Labeling, and Genetic Testing for Drug Prescription: An International Approach, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
519, 528–29 (2004) (noting that physicians may face liability for prescribing off-label ―genotypicallydefined drug[s]‖ when genetic testing could have shown the drugs to be harmful or ineffective).
273. See Greely, supra note 22, at 2 (discussing the potential levels of beneficence that will be
required by regulatory bodies such as the FDA for approval of drugs that are effective for an identifiable
and lesser part of the population or, alternatively, may only harm a particular and trivial part of the
population while providing benefits to others).
274. See Evans et al., supra note 75, at 1290 (elaborating that although a group may not respond
collectively when results are averaged, individuals within that group still have potential for response,
and as a result, such individuals may be harmed if denied treatment, particularly when there are no other
treatment options).
275. MELZER ET AL., supra note 48, at 49.
276. Evans et al., supra note 75, at 1290.
277. See Rothstein, supra note 267, at 118–19.
278. See Marchant, supra note 264, at 10650.
279. See Urquhart et al., supra note 17 (explaining that ―failure to test‖ as a cause of action has been
rejected as an independent claim by more cogent case law).
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opinion may not make it past the gatekeeper, because it could not meet the
scientific reliability standards of expert testimony required by Daubert.280
Moreover, patients could attempt to hold pharmaceutical companies
responsible for failing to incorporate pharmacogenomic technology into their drug
development process.281 There is a noted lack of legal duty to use
pharmacogenomics to discover potential new drugs and reduce major drug adverse
reactions—for example, idiosyncratic liver injuries that occur on a rare basis with a
number of drugs.282 Some critics, however, assert that individuals should not be
able to sue a drug manufacturer for failure to use pharmacogenomics to develop a
drug that will reveal an individual‘s predisposition to deleterious side effects,
because ―[p]rematurely imposing an actual or de facto duty on drug makers to use
these technologies will discourage the cooperative atmosphere needed to overcome
the current limitations of pharmacogenetics and pharmacogenomics.‖283
3. Shifts in the Standard of Care
Pharmacogenomics may shift physicians‘ expected standard of care, although
it is unclear at what point and to what extent the standard will change to require
physicians to conduct genetic tests and prescribe drugs accordingly. 284 Critics have
expressed concerns about imposing liability for adverse outcomes resulting from
the use of pharmacogenomics in diagnosis and treatment decisions. 285 In the future,
healthcare providers can expect to bear a larger share of the costs when treatment
options fail for lack of individualized treatment. 286
At the industry level, imposing legal liability may obstruct research by
deterring pharmaceutical companies from engaging in pharmacogenomic
development for fear of being sued. Greater precision may shift the standard of care
such that companies could increasingly be held responsible for ineffective
treatment or ADRs. As pharmacogenomics develops, treatment effectiveness and

280. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 589–90 (1993) (holding that the trial judge is
the gatekeeper in deciding whether an expert‘s testimony with respect to ―scientific knowledge‖ meets
the standard of evidentiary relevance and reliability). See also Urquhart et al., supra note 17 (explaining
that expert testimony supporting claims of drug-induced liver injury should be excluded by the trial
judge because the hypothesis that pharmacogenomics may identify at risk patients has not been tested,
has not been supported in peer review materials, has an unknown error rate, and is not generally
accepted by the scientific community).
281. See Urquhart et al., supra note 17 (hypothesizing that patients harmed by certain drugs may
claim the drug manufacturer had a duty to implement pharmacogenomic testing techniques to identify
possible adverse drug reactions).
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. See MELZER ET AL., supra note 48, at 12, 49.
285. Id.
286. See generally Evans et al., supra note 75 (suggesting that policymakers establish incentives to
encourage health care providers to develop more targeted therapies and avoid the 65 billion dollars
wasted per year on therapies that either did not help or were detrimental to patients).
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side effects will become increasingly within drug manufacturers‘ control.287 One
company, Novartis, has ―offered customers a money-back guarantee on two of its
antihypertensive drugs,‖ demonstrating behavior more like that of other industries
than the drug industry.288 However, mandating such action ―would be an extreme
approach to the desired incentive structure . . . rife with ethical, social, industry and
community concerns, even if science were fully ready to support it.‖289 Thus, the
FDA has explored a ―safe harbor‖ from liability provision in any federal
regulations involving pharmacogenomics in order to facilitate experimentation. 290
The anticipated changes to the standard of care for physicians and drug
manufacturers may be, in part, a reaction to lawsuits that have been filed around the
country.291 One such example are the personal liability suits in which, after taking
the vaccine LYMErix, individuals claimed severe health problems akin to those
associated with Lyme disease.292 The product was heavily advertised directly to
consumers, and physicians expressed the common worry associated with direct-toconsumer genetic testing—that patients would demand prescriptions even when it
was medically inadvisable.293 Additionally, ―[o]thers feared vaccinated people
would gain a false sense of security and let their guard down against ticks.‖294
In 1999, a number of affected individuals brought a class action case against
the manufacturer of LYMErix, SmithKline Beecham, alleging that it had failed to
warn doctors and the public that nearly a third of the general population (those with
the HLA-DR4+ allele) is susceptible to developing autoimmune arthritis if they are
exposed to the protein that makes the vaccine work. 295 In 2000, many of those who
participated in the class action suit also filed individually against the manufacturer,
asking that it expand its vaccine labeling. 296 The plaintiffs‘ allegations included a
failure by the drug company to warn consumers of the potential adverse effects of

287. Id. at 1289–90.
288. Id. at 1290.
289. Id.
290. See Urquhart et al., supra note 17.
291. See Rothstein, supra note 211, at 326 (noting that the various potential liability theories for
suits related to pharmacogenomic claims). Rothstein specifically notes the following liability theories:
―failure to order genetic testing, improper interpretation of genetic test results, failure to provide
necessary genetic counseling, failure to prescribe the proper medication and dosage, failure to warn the
patient of possible adverse events . . . and failure to dispense or administer the medication properly,‖ as
well as, perhaps, failure to not prescribe a drug. Id.
292. Susan Warner, Patients Sue Over Effects of Vaccine a Medication to Prevent Lyme Disease
Made Them Ill, They Say, in Court Filings Against SmithKline, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 13, 2000, at C1.
293. Id.
294. Id. (noting the vaccine has a rate of 78 percent effectiveness).
295. Cassidy v. SmithKline Beecham, No. 99-10423, 2003 WL 22216528 (Pa. Com. Pl. July 1,
2003). See also Rothstein, supra note 211, at 327 (using the Cassidy case as an example of potential
liability for a drug manufacturer could face when there was a failure to warn).
296. Holcomb B. Noble, 3 Suits Say Lyme Vaccine Caused Severe Arthritis, N.Y. TIMES, June 13,
2000, at F6.
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the vaccine.297 In 2002, the drug was removed from the market due to a reduction
in sales, likely resulting from the negative publicity surrounding the lawsuits. 298
The class action case is particularly interesting because, first, rather than seeking
compensation for past injuries, as tort law usually mandates, the plaintiffs sought
―protection against the risks of future injury.‖299 Second, the case is significant
because, for maybe the first time, the class was explicitly defined by genotype.300
IV. CONCLUSION
Pharmacogenomics will have far-reaching and diverse effects on drug
research and development. It promises to reduce adverse drug reactions and allow
physicians to make more accurate diagnoses and prescription and dosage
decisions.301 We as a society—individually and collectively—must choose the most
appropriate regulatory and legal pathways in the effort to establish an adequate and
protective system, both for individuals seeking new and effective drugs and society
at large. The field of pharmacogenomics and associated genetic discoveries shape,
and are shaped by, the current regulatory regime under the guidance of the FDA. 302
Legal and policy decision-makers, as well as insurance companies and the
pharmaceutical industry, are entrusted with the responsibility of making proper
resource allocation decisions. By properly distributing resources through, for
example, the Orphan Drug Act, we can ensure that certain historically underserved
groups are given access to therapeutic advancements. 303
Each of the various players could positively or adversely affect the role that
pharmacogenomics can and will play in providing therapeutic innovations to the

297. Id.
298. Emily Sohn, Lyme Disease: Where‟s the Vaccine?, DISCOVERY NEWS (June, 17, 2011),
http://news.discovery.com/human/lyme-disease-ticks-vaccine-110617.html.
299. Larry I. Palmer, Medical Liability for Pharmacogenomics, in PHARMACOGENOMICS: SOCIAL,
ETHICAL, AND CLINICAL DIMENSIONS 187, 200 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 2003) (emphasis added).
300. See, e.g., Marchant, supra note 264, at 10651 (citing court use of genetic heterogeneity as a
factor for denying class certification in cases involving toxic injury).
301. See generally John A. Robertson et al., Pharmacogenetic Challenges for the Health Care
System, 21 HEALTH AFF. 155, 159 (2002) (discussing the potential of pharmacogenetic research to
enable physicians to prescribe safer and more effective medication). See also Mark A. Rothstein &
Carlton A. Hornung, Public Attitudes About Pharmacogenomics, in PHARMACOGENOMICS: SOCIAL,
ETHICAL, AND CLINICAL DIMENSIONS 3, 3 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 2003) (noting how
pharmacogenomics are likely to develop ―new pharmaceutical products . . . that decrease adverse drug
reactions and improve the treatment of many serious diseases.‖).
302. See Rothstein, supra note 211, at 328 (specifying four likely approaches the FDA may take
with respect to pharmacogenomics, including regulation of test kits in clinical settings for commercial
diagnostics, subdivision of target populations to enable better scrutiny, evaluation of clinical trials for
safety and efficacy, and consideration of genetic factors when reviewing post-marketing safety data).
303. See Cheung et al., supra note 231, at 183 (specifying rare disease sufferers as one such
historically underserved group).
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public.304 The pharmaceutical industry must choose whether to pursue
pharmacogenomic research and development, depending on financial and other
incentives. Congress and the regulatory agencies must choose whether, and how, to
encourage pharmacogenomic innovations while providing equal and fair access to
targeted therapies and drugs.305 Policy-makers must also determine, through the
patent system, how to balance the promotion of downstream pharmacogenomic
research while protecting the rights of innovators. 306 Likewise, they must consider
the appropriate liability regime for industry, which must avoid discouraging the
pharmaceutical industry from pursuing valuable therapeutic advancements. 307
Liability laws must also continue to allow physician independence while still
protecting the interests of the patient, striking a balance between the conflicting
standards of paternalism and patient autonomy.308 In light of these diverse
decisions, education regarding the promises and consequences of
pharmacogenomics is a basic, but significant, necessity. 309 Targeted education is
fundamental to different aspects of society, including the public at large, the
regulatory bodies that make policy choices, and physicians and health care
providers.
The implications that the current legal regime has for pharmacogenomics, and
vice versa, have only begun to be explored. However, it is imperative to proactively
anticipate the potential dilemmas and issues associated with scientific advancement
in order to keep legal and ethical considerations current with technological
innovations. Only in this way can we hope to effectively advance, rather than
hinder, appropriate technological progress while protecting the rights of individuals
and ensuring that they receive the best medical treatment available.
304. See Evans et al., supra note 75, at 1291 (emphasizing that if legislators and courts at the federal,
state and local levels do not create substantial incentives to promote research in tandem with private
industry, a financial crisis may undermine the current therapeutic promise offered by
pharmacogenomics).
305. See id. at 1289, 1290 (predicting that ―bold leadership‖ will be required by regulatory bodies to
guide the private industry through a ―wrenching period of transition‖ towards targeted therapies); see
also Rothstein, supra note 211, at 331–32 (arguing that leaving pharmacogenomic development and
cost-setting completely to free market forces may result in worse health care access outcomes than
currently exist and that Congress should tailor the Orphan Drug Act in light of the recent progress in
pharmacogenomics).
306. See Nunnally et al., supra note 132, at 111, 118–119 (noting that while gene patents are critical
for continued industry innovation in pharmacogenomics, legislators may narrow the scope of protection
to address concerns that that the high cost of licensing fees may be inhibiting other medical research).
307. See Palmer, supra note 299, at 188 (arguing that the basic tenets of medical liability must be
reexamined to account for ―systemic approaches to risk reduction‖ for parties developing and allocating
pharmacogenomics-based products).
308. See id. at 189–190 (noting a new ―professional-patient dyad‖ must be developed allow theories
of medical liability to accommodate advances in pharmacogenomics).
309. See MELZER ET AL., supra note 48, at 12 (specifying that pharmacogenetics must become part
of the undergraduate and postgraduate health professional educational programs); see also Rothstein,
supra note 211, at 326 (describing the necessity for all health professionals to be trained in
pharmacogenomics).

